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"A MAN'S HOME IS HIS CASTLE?": REFLECTIONS ON THE
HOME, THE FAMILY, AND PRIVACY DURING THE LATE
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
JONATHAN L. HAFETZ*
The maxim that a "man's house is his castle" is one of the oldest
and most deeply rooted principles in Anglo-American jurisprudence.'
It reflects an egalitarian spirit that embraces all levels of society
down to the "poorest man" living "in his cottage."2 The maxim also
forms part of the fabric of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution,3 which protects people, their homes, and their property
against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.4
Despite the continuing erosion of this protection in other places,5
* Staff Attorney, The Partnership for the Homeless. J.D., 1999, Yale Law School; M.
Phil., 1992, Oxford University; B.A., 1990, Amherst College. The author would like to thank
Martha Pollack for her encouragement and suggestions, and Reva Siegel for her comments
on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (discussing the influence
of the common-law maxim on the Supreme Court).
2. William Pitt wrote:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter - all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
William Pitt, Speech on the Excise Bill (1763) (quoted in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
307 (1958)).
3. See, e.g., THOMASM. COOLEY, ATREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 365 (Law Book
Exchange 1998) (1868) (stating the common law maxim that "every man's house is his castle,"
which "secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the
government," has been incorporated into the Fourth Amendment); see also Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on maxim in stating that Fourth
Amendment incorporates common law requirement that police officers "knock and announce"
before executing a warrant at a private home absent narrow exceptions).
4. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting
the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174
(1988) (noting that recent "Supreme Court decisions have steadily reduced the scope of the
privacy and liberty rights that the fourth amendment protects"); Scott E. Sundby, A Return
to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
383, 383 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has maintained "a semblance of coherent
fourth amendment analysis only by resorting to exceptions or an ill-defined balancing test...
merely render[ing] fourth amendment analysis more makeshift, lacking continuity in design
and purpose").
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including on streets,6 in automobiles,' at airports,8 and in schools,9 the
home retains a special place in search and seizure law,"0 and
continues to symbolize a zone of privacy often beyond the reach of the
modern regulatory state."
The home has traditionally received the greatest protection in
criminal cases and less protection in civil or regulatory matters. 2
6. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (establishing the less stringent
reasonable suspicion standard for warrantless "stop and frisk" searches by police).
7. See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1999) (upholding warrantless seizure
of automobile from public place where police had probable cause to believe it was forfeitable
contraband but lacked probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband); Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (extending less stringent reasonable suspicion standard
to the passenger compartment of an automobile); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 54 (2001) ("This is because '[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive
and continuing governmental regulation and controls.'") (citing South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (upholding the warrantless
search of a passenger's luggage at an airport based on a reasonable suspicion that it contained
narcotics).
9. See, e.g., Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50, 653, 661-63 (1995)
(permitting suspicionless drug testing of public school students participating in interscholastic
athletics); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985) (applying reasonable suspicion
standard to warrantless search of a student by school authorities).
10. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001) ("'At the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'") (citing Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating that
it has long been "a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable") (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) ("[T]he sanctity of
private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.");
Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model"Approach to the Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!,
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 444-45 (1993) (discussing the continuing vitality of the
warrant requirement with respect to searches of the home; contrasting the Court's treatment
of the home to that of outdoor searches); see also Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment] gives the guarantee that a
man's home is his castle beyond invasion either by inquisitive or by officious people. A man
loses that privacy of course when he goes upon the streets or enters public places."); cf. Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,331 (2001) (upholding seizure of defendant outside his home based
on probable cause where police prevented defendant from entering his home while they sought
a warrant to search his home for drugs; emphasizing that police "avoid[ed] significant
intrusion into the home itself").
11. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,565 (1969) (defendant asserted "the right to read
or observe what he pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of his own home.... Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home.").
12. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959) (holding the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement did not apply to municipal housing inspection because,
inter alia, it was not a criminal investigation), overruled by Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523,
534, 539 (1967). The Court rejected the argument that administrative housing and fire
inspections were outside the warrant requirement; holding, instead the standard for obtaining
such warrants was not the traditional standard of probable cause based on individualized
suspicion, but rather a lower standard of reasonableness based on a weighing of the
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Scholars have explained this distinction in terms of the history of
the Fourth Amendment," the fear of hampering public health and
safety inspections, 4 and the less intrusive nature of non-criminal
searches.'" A simple civil-criminal dichotomy, however, only partly
explains the varied treatment of the home over time.
This Article addresses a lacuna in the extensive literature on
privacy and search and seizure law by examining how the interplay
of social factors such as gender, class, and race 6 have helped shape
legal doctrines affecting the home and influenced the home's
treatment by courts, legislatures, public officials, and private
agencies. To do so, this Article explores the treatment of the home
from the 1870s through the 1920s, the period of American history
roughly encompassed by the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.17 On
the one hand, this period saw the elevation of the home in cases
involving threats to domestic privacy, and in seminal constitutional
search and seizure cases. On the other hand, it witnessed highly
invasive and discretionary treatment of the home in connection with
governmental and individual interests. Id.; see also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323
(1971) (holding a home visit by welfare official was not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment; distinguishing the home visit from a criminal investigation); cf. United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding under certain circumstances the exclusionary
rule does not bar the federal government's use of illegally seized evidence in a civil tax
proceeding); Sundby, supra note 5, at 389 (noting that where the Fourth Amendment
governed, "it provided the full protections of the warrant clause - but the protections
generally did not apply to government intrusions other than criminal investigations"); Ronald
F. Wright, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J.
1127, 1127 (1984) (noting courts "have applied a stricter, more rule-oriented 'probable cause'
analysis in criminal cases, but have resorted to a more flexible and less rule-bound 'balancing'
methodology in civil cases") (footnote omitted).
13. See Frank, 359 U.S. at 365 (stating that "it was on the issue of the right to be secure
from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that ... were
the historic impulses behind the Fourth Amendment and its analogues in state
constitutions").
14. See id. at 372.
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling
places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat
a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of
community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket
requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal
acts.
Id.; see also Sundby, supra note 5, at 388-89 (noting the Supreme Court's concern that
"requiring a warrant based on probable cause would have precluded suspicionless government
inspections").
15. See Wright, supra note 12, at 1135-39.
16. For the sake of simplicity, use of the term "race" in this Article includes the concept
of both race and ethnicity. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter
Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 570 n.23 (2001).
17. The Gilded Age describes the period from the Civil War to the 1890s. The Progressive
Era describes the period from the 1890s to 1920.
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various social reforms aimed at society's more marginal members,
such as the poor, immigrants, and single mothers. By comparing
the home's treatment in these different contexts, this Article
describes some of the tensions and contradictions behind the idea of
a man's home as his castle. It also suggests why, even today, a
court's willingness to protect the home turns in part on the social
context of a given intrusion.18
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries experienced
a dramatic expansion in regulatory activity at all levels of govern-
ment. Goaded by various reform groups, states and cities rejected
the traditional laissez-faire model of government to address the
mounting social problems associated with industrialization,
urbanization, and immigration. 9 For example, states enacted
legislation to provide assistance to single mothers and to regulate
hours and working conditions, while cities established housing codes
and mandated public health inspections.
There was always tension, however, between the goals and the
means used to achieve them. Reformers, predominantly middle
class, native-born Protestants, 20 often sought to control those - the
poor, single mothers, and immigrants - whom they believed most
threatened the social order. Reforms, like financial aid to single
mothers, involved extensive intervention into the homes and private
lives of recipients. Likewise, intervention in the homes of poor
families expanded through child neglect and abuse investigations,
and frequently led to the removal of children to institutions.
These developments occurred against the backdrop of sweeping
proclamations about the sanctity of the home in seminal federal
constitutional criminal procedure cases. Faced with the prospect of
increasing government intrusion through regulatory enforcement,
the Supreme Court drew the Fourth Amendment's protections
around "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."21
Meanwhile, state courts blocked potential intrusions into the
18. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1369 (1992)
(arguing that the extent to which privacy is protected in recent Supreme Court cases has
depended on their context that the Court has been less likely to call reasonable an expectation
of privacy where "the individual's claim to secrecy or solitude collides with the government's
war on drugs and alcohol"); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute in case where defendant was prosecuted for
having homosexual relations with another man in bedroom of his own home).
19. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914 (1957);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
20. See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE DEATH OF
LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 173-255 (1984).
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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privacy of domestic relations by resisting punishment of marital
violence, establishing interspousal tort immunity, and providing
new justifications for common law spousal evidentiary privileges.
In these instances, the home was not to be a laboratory for social
reform, but rather the bedrock of personal liberty and domestic
harmony.
Part I describes the privileged status of the home and its close
association with private property, domestic privacy, and prevailing
Victorian era ideals about gender and class. First, it briefly
summarizes the origin of the maxim that a "man's home is his
castle" and its influence on the Framers of the Constitution.
Second, it examines how the existence of criminal penalties and the
availability of civil remedies protected the home against physical
intrusion during the nineteenth century. It also explores how courts
secured the home from perceived threats to its peace and privacy by
resisting prosecution of marital violence and interspousal tort suits
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Third, it
explores the expansion of constitutional protection of the home, from
the rise of modern Fourth Amendment litigation in regulatory
actions of the early 1880s through its rapid growth in the 1920s
following the advent of national Prohibition.
The remainder of the Article presents a very different picture
of the home's treatment during this period. Part II focuses on the
child protection movement, exploring how private agencies,
reformers, and newly formed juvenile courts responded to a
perceived social crisis by intervening in the homes of poor families,
single mothers, and immigrants to address issues like child welfare
and custody. While child welfare agents and reformers often
maintained the long-term goal of increasing individual privacy, they
sought to achieve it by restructuring existing family relations along
lines dictated by their own prevailing middle-class norms and paid
little, if any, heed to how their efforts eroded privacy in the home of
other social groups.
Part III turns to mothers' pensions - social welfare programs
adopted by most states in the first decades of the twentieth century
to provide assistance to single mothers and the forerunner of
subsequent federal welfare programs. Here, the invasion of
domestic privacy reached its apex, as concerns about gender, class,
and national origins dramatically shaped the programs' design and
implementation.
Part IV examines tenement housing reform for another
perspective on how social factors influenced the treatment of the
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home, the family, and privacy. It describes the use of detailed
housing codes and broad inspections to improve housing conditions,
combat disease, promote assimilation of immigrants, and reduce
poverty. It then compares tenement housing reform with other
social reforms to draw conclusions about the complex, and some-
times surprising, interplay of factors shaping the home's treatment
during this period.
I. THE HOME IN THE CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT
A. Roots of the Common Law Maxim that "A Man's Home is His
Castle."
The maxim that "a man's home is his castle" has deep roots in
the Anglo-American legal tradition.22 The home's privileged legal
status traditionally derived from the sanctity of private property,2'
and applied only to a person in his own home.' Many considered
the right to exclude others2  - one of the "bundle of property
rights"26 - essential to "the safety and repose to [a man] and [his]
family."27
The common law gave meaning to the maxim in various ways,
including protecting a man's right to repel intruders from his
22. See Thomas Y. Davies, Rediscovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L,
REV. 547, 642 n.259 (1999) (tracing the origin of the maxim to at least the early sixteenth
century); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223 ("[The law has] so particular
and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house that it stiles it his castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity."); Davies, supra at 642 ("The domicile was a sacrosanct
interest in late eighteenth-century common law, as evidenced by the doctrine that 'a man's
house is his castle.'"); cf. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).
23. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139 ("So great moreover is the regard of
the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for
the general good of the community.").
24. See id. at 287 ("[I]t is the defendant's own dwelling which by law is said to be his
castle; for if he be in the house of another, bailiff or sheriff may break and enter it to effect his
purpose....").
25. See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215,250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying
it.").
26. See, e.g., John Lewis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES § 64, at 55 (William S. Hein 1997) (1888) ("The dullest individual among the people
knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.").
27. State v. Armfield, 9 N.C. 246, 246 (1822). Courts broadly interpreted the right,
extending it not only to family members but also to those with a legal right to be present in
the home, such as a boarder or servant. See Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816) (addressing
trespass action against a deputy sheriff who pursued a boarder into the plaintiffs house to
make an arrest).
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home,28 and to bring an action in trespass for damages.29 In
criminal cases, a sheriff could not forcibly enter a man's home
without signifying the cause of his coming and requesting to enter."
The common law also did not recognize a broad doctrine of official
immunity that might otherwise limit the home's protection.3'
Criminal sanctions further underscore the home's importance.
Sanctions were imposed not only for offenses such as burglary,
arson, and nuisance,32 but also for unlawful entries by public
officials like sheriffs or bailiffs who might break down doors to
execute civil process. 33 Furthermore, criminal penalties for eaves-
dropping addressed the intrusions that did not involve a physical
trespass but which nonetheless threatened domestic privacy.'
Many also tied the home to the idea of political rights. Owning
a house - being a "freeholder" - was the basic standard for
membership in the political community in England,3" and it
continued to determine political rights during-the colonial period36
and through the first half of the nineteenth century in America.37
28. Davies, supra note 22, at 643-44 (discussing authorities); Craig Hemmens, I Hear You
Knocking: The Supreme Court Rejects the Knock and Announce Rule, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 559,
562 n.27 (1998) ("If any person attempts ... to break open a house in the nighttime ... and shall
be killed in such attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged.") (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 180); see also Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1603)
(explaining that while a homicide committed in self-defense was still a felony, a killing in
defense of one's home was not).
29. See Davies, supra note 22, at 625 (noting the requirements for the common law action
of trespass were "the invasion was a direct result of the defendant's act and interference with
plaintiffs interest in the exclusive possession of his land"); Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance,
and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464-65 (1959).
30. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 ("[Iun all cases when the King is party, the
sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do
other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it,
he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors."); see also 1
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 583 (1736) ("A man, that arrests upon suspicion of felony, may
break open doors, if the party refuse upon demand to open them.").
31. See Davies, supra note 22, at 625.
32. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 168 ("Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or eaves of
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous
tales.").
35. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN.
* L. REV. 335, 340 (1989).
36. See id. at 339 ("By the middle of the eighteenth century all American colonies save
[South Carolina] had adopted election laws which denied the colony franchise to those who
owned no property.").
37. See id. at 353 ("During [the 1820s, '30s, and '40s,] the overwhelming majority of states
replaced their property owning qualifications either with taxpaying qualifications (with or
without pauper exclusions), or with provisions for white manhood suffrage (with pauper
exclusions).").
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Scholars linked property ownership to the idea of family govern-
ment, with the father, as head of the household, "commanding the
loyalty" of those dependent on him, such as wife, child, and proper-
tyless wage earners, in return for their maintenance, care and
protection.3" As John Adams stated, those without property are "to
all intents and purposes as much dependent upon others, who will
please to feed, clothe, and employ them, as women are upon their
husbands, or children on their parents."39
Most importantly, the idea that "a man's home is his castle"
influenced the adoption and development of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution,4" and the limits it places on the government's
power to conduct searches and seizures.4' The link between the
Fourth Amendment and searches of private homes dates to a trio of
famous cases from the late colonial era:42 Entick v. Carrington,43
Wilkes v. Wood," and the Boston Writs of Assistance Case.45 Only
the Boston Writs of Assistance Case occurred in the American
colonies (in Boston), but all three were well-known to the Framers
as well as to the colonial population, and proved influential in the
drafting of various provisions of the Bill of Rights, particularly the
Fourth Amendment.46
Entick and Wilkes involved damage suits by authors of political
pamphlets whose homes officials of the Crown had ransacked, and
whose books and papers the officials seized. 47 The Boston Writs of
Assistance Case involved a challenge to the virtually unlimited
power of British customs officials to search for and seize goods
imported in violation of the customs laws.' In these cases, the
38. Id. at 344-45.
39. 9 J. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF J. ADAMS § 376-77 (C. Adams ed., 1864) (letter from John
Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776); Steinfeld, supra note 36, at 341.
40. See supra note 4; see also Gormley, supra note 18, at 1358 (stating the notion "carried
over [from England] with a nearly-sacred resolve to the American colonies"). The Framers
also safeguarded the home through the Third Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No
soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without consent of the Owner, nor
in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
41. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) ("It is axiomatic that 'physical entry'
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.")
(quoting United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
42. See, William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 396-97 (1993).
43. 19 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME
1029 (T.B. Howell ed., 1813) [hereinafter Howell's State Trials].
44. Id. at 1153.
45. See generally M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
46. See Stuntz, supra note 42, at 396-97.
47. See id. at 397-98.
48. See SMITH, supra note 45, at 51-59.
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conception of the home as a man's castle formed the basis of
opposition to overreaching executive authority. As James Otis
argued in the Boston Writs of Assistance Case:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he
is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This
writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this
privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when
they please - we are commanded to permit their entry - their
menial servants may enter - may break locks, bars and every
thing in their way - and whether they break through malice or
revenge, no man, no court can inquire - bare suspicion without
oath is sufficient.49
While these seminal cases had little if any practical impact' on
contemporary law enforcement or on typical criminal cases,"° they
not only solidified the link between the home and common law
trespass," but also tied the home to domestic privacy and harmony.
Every English[man] ... takes a Pride and he glories justly in that
strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightfull tranquil-
ity which the Laws have thus secured to him in his own House
... [and to deprive him of this would be to treat him] not like an
Englishman, not like a Freeman but like a slave. 2
As described below, the connection between the home, private
property, and domestic privacy would influence the later develop-
ment of constitutional search and seizure law.53
49. Id. at 344 (reprinting James Otis, Address); see also Howell's State Trials, supra note
43, at 1063 (Pratt, C.J.) (warning that if warrantless searches of private papers were
permitted "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown
open to the search and inspection of a messenger").
50. See Stuntz, supra note 42, at 400.
51. See William C. Heffernan, Foreword to The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as
a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 828 (2000) ("Common law cases that influenced
the drafters of the Fourth Amendment unequivocally identified trespass as a prerequisite to
establishing the search and seizure liability of government officials.").
52. Davies, supra note 22, at 642-43 n.260 (quoting Adams' notes of his argument in the
1774 case King v. Stewart, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller
B. Zobel eds., 1965)).
53. See infra Part I.C.
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B. Treatment of the Home in the Nineteenth Century
During the nineteenth century, the imposition of criminal
penalties and the availability of civil remedies helped ensure the
"sanctity and inviolability" of the family home. 5' Judicial doctrines
concerning marital violence, interspousal tort suits, and spousal
evidentiary privileges helped shield the family from legal interfer-
ence and the glare of unwanted publicity. Insofar as there was a
"right of privacy" during the nineteenth century, it was closely tied
to the four walls of a man's home.55
1. Criminal Penalties
Courts continued to impose severe criminal sanctions for
offenses, like burglary, that threatened the "peculiar sanctity" of the
private dwelling, "the family abode ... [and] the place of family
repose."56 Courts also continued to administer criminal sanctions
for trespass by officials seeking to execute civil process.57 Criminal
eavesdropping statutes provided some protection in instances where
there was no actual physical trespass.' The legislature intended
sanctions for eavesdropping to protect private discourse in the home
by punishing those caught "hanging about a dwelling house of
another, hearing tattle, and repeating it to the disturbance of the
neighborhood." s Indeed, some thought eavesdropping could cause
54. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892,
1895-96 (1991) (quoting Christian v. State, 96 Ala. 89, 91 (1892)).
55. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905) ("It is to be conceded that
prior to 1890 every adjudicated case, both in this country and in England, which might be said
to have involved a right of privacy, was not based upon the existence of such right, but was
founded upon a supposed right of property...."); Sanford E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and
Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and
Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 521 n.320 (1986) (describing the
scope of nineteenth century privacy protection as "any physical trespass against the person
or into the sanctity of the home") (citing Howell's State Trials, supra note 43); cf. Ives v.
Humphrey, 1 E.D. Smith 196, 201-02 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1851) (imposing liability for "injury,
insult, [and] invasion of privacy").
56. Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 209, 210 (Ky. 1889) (construing broadly the
relevant burglary statute in holding that the cellar, which was part of the house where the
occupant and his family slept, fell within the scope of the statute).
57. See State v. Armfield, 9 N.C. 246 (1822) (affirming conviction of officer who broke open
an outer door to execute civil process).
58. See City of Grand Rapids v. Williams, 112 Mich. 247, 248-50 (1897) (affirming
conviction for violating an ordinance prohibiting "indecent, insulting, or immoral conduct"
where defendant had been "peeking into the windows of an occupied, lighted residence, and
especially at the hours of night when people usually retire").
59. State v. Pennington, 40 Tenn. 299, 300-01 (1859) (calling it "an indictable offence to
clandestinely hearken to the discourse of a private family") (quoting 2 BISHOP'S CR. LAw 174).
"A MAN'S HOME IS HIS CASTLE"
a "great terror and disturbance of the family, to the annoyance and
inconvenience of the inhabitants of [the] house."" Additionally,
courts continued to adhere to the "castle doctrine," which permitted
a man attacked in his own home to use deadly force against an
assailant rather than "give up the possession of his house to his
adversary by flight.""'
2. Civil Remedies
Civil remedies for trespass also continued to provide an
important means of deterring unwanted intrusions in the home.62
The common law presumed a search or arrest to be an unlawful
trespass unless otherwise justified. During the nineteenth
century, individuals could bring trespass actions for unlawful
entries by officials to attach property' or levy process.65 Individuals
were most likely to bring trespass actions (and to succeed) where
the officer attempted an arrest or search without a warrant, an
action the officer undertook "at his peril."6 While the frequency
60. State v. Davis, 51 S.E. 897, 897 (N.C. 1905). In practice, however, indictments for
eavesdropping were never numerous and might be quashed for various deficiencies. See Irwin
R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis. 39 CATH. U. L.
REV. 703, 706 (1990); see, e.g., Davis, 51 S.E. at 897 (affirming lower court's decision to quash
an eavesdropping indictment for failure to charge that such conduct was habitual).
61. People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243 (1914) (Cardozo, J.) (quoting 1 HALE'S PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 486); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563 (1894):
A man may repel force by force in the defense of his person, habitation, or
property against any one or many who manifestly intend and endeavor to
commit a known felony by violence or surprise or either. In such case he is not
compelled to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he finds himself out of
danger, and if, in the conflict between them he happen to kill him, such killing
is justifiable.
Id. Some form of the castle doctrine still remains in force today in every state. See, e.g., State
v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 569 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1997).
62. See Note, supra note 54, at 1894; see also Stuntz, supra note 42, at 441, 447 n.111
(citing damage suits by individuals for searches of their homes; noting the general rule that
a valid warrant usually absolved the individual performing the search of any civil liability).
63. See Davies, supra note 22, at 624; see also Stanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 286,
289 (1816) (recognizing that revenue officers who searched a home for goods without a valid
warrant could be held liable for trespass; stating "every one [sic] is presumed to know that the
dwellinghouse of another cannot be lawfully forced, unless for purposes especially provided
for by law").
64. See, eg., Ilsley v. Nichols, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 270, 271 (1831) (discussing well-
established principle that an action for trespass lies where a sheriff breaks the door of a home
to execute a writ for the seizure of property). As Chief Justice Shaw observed, "[T]he
protection of a debtor's effects from attachment in his house is not the design of the law, but
only an incidental protection, resulting from the provision, that a man's house is his castle."
Id. at 273-74.
65. See, e.g., Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 Ill. 357, 359 (1869).
66. Davies, supra note 22, at 627 (citing Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 317-18 (Pa. 1814)).
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with which individuals brought such trespass actions is uncertain,67
they appear to have been more common in civil cases. 68 Unlawful
arrests or searches also exposed the officer to lawful resistance by
bystanders or by the target of his intrusion.69 In broadly protecting
against invasion of the property by others, common law trespass
provided one of the "[b]asic kernels of privacy.""
In addition to preserving the sanctity of private property, civil
liability also provided a means for enforcing prevailing sexual
norms. For example, a Vermont court held a private lodger could
recover against the house's owner where the owner had stealthily
entered her room at night and made unwanted sexual advances
upon her.71 The court explained, "when a married man breaks into
the bedroom of a chaste and honest woman at midnight, and
proposes to her sexual and criminal commerce with her, the act is
wholly wrongful; the aim and purpose is wrongful....
3. The Home and the Veil of Privacy
Judicial resistance to prosecutions of marital violence, the
establishment of interspousal tort immunity, and newjustifications
for spousal evidentiary privileges demonstrated the desire to
preserve the sanctity of the home. The treatment of these issues
reveals some of the values associated with the home and under-
scores the link between domestic privacy and traditional (male)
social prerogatives.
67. Compare Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 133, 135 (1829) (describing
actions against officers, including claims of misfeasance or nonfeasance as well as
malfeasance in the execution of writs in civil cases, as "among the most common actions in
our courts") (quoted in Davies, supra note 22, at 626 n.206), with Stuntz, supra note 42, at 420
(describing "a scattering of early nineteenth-century trespass suits against sheriffs for illegal
searches or arrests that arose out of ordinary investigations").
68. See Davies, supra note 22, at 625 n.205.
69. See id. at 625 (describing the "relatively robust understanding of a citizen's right to
resist an officer who exceeded his authority"). Use of force to prevent an officer from making
an unlawful arrest was not a crime unless the officer was killed or seriously injured, and
forcible resistance to constables was not uncommon. See id. at 750 n.204 (citing cases).
70. Gormley, supra note 18, at 1343.
71. See Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880).
72. Id. at 592; cf. Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 527-28 (1892) (allowing
recovery under theory of damages to easements against elevated railway company due to "loss
of privacy" occasioned by the ability of company's passengers and employees to look into
plaintiffs upper-story windows from the platform and stairs of its station).
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a. Marital Violence and Resistance to Intervention
Traditionally, the state could not prosecute a husband for
inflicting corporal punishment or "chastisement" upon his wife for
failure to obey his commands as long as he did not cause her
permanent injury.73 A husband could use force "within reasonable
bounds" against his wife, just as a father traditionally could "correct
his apprentices or children." 4 During the middle of the nineteenth
century, the doctrine of marital chastisement came under increasing
fire, leading to its repudiation by the end of the Civil War.75 The
demise of marital chastisement did not, however, lead to widespread
criminal prosecutions for marital violence but, as Reva Siegel has
persuasively argued, saw the emergence of an "affect-based concep-
tion" of the marital relationship, with the wife magnanimously
yielding to her husband's desires in place of their former patriar-
chal, "authority-based" relationship.76
As Siegel observes, fear of "raising the curtain upon domestic
privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence" replaced a
husband's right to chastise his wife.77 Courts feared that interfering
in such domestic disputes would endanger the ideal of the home as
a refuge of "[d]isinterested love" and "affection" that provided
sanctuary from the harsh world outside.78 As one court stated:
Mere ebullitions of passion, impulsive violence, and temporary
pain, affection will soon forget and forgive.... But when trifles
are taken hold of by the public, and the parties are exposed and
disgraced, and each endeavors to justify himself or herself by
73. See, Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2123-24 (1996) (discussing the English common law origins of the husband's
right); see also Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence, 1640-1980, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE 19, 29-30 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1989) (noting that "[n]o
laws against family violence were passed from the time of the Pilgrim statute against wife
beating in 1672 until a law against wife beating was enacted in Tennessee in 1850";
explaining that "[t]he general lack of interest in family violence can be attributed to the
growing distrust of government interference in the family, the increasing respect for domestic
privacy, and the waning zeal for state enforcement of private morality").
74. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 444.
75. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871); see also Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108
Mass. 458, 461 (1871) ("Beating or striking a wife violently with the open hand is not one of
the rights conferred on a husband by the marriage, even if the wife be drunk or insolent.").
76. Siegel, supra note 73, at 2144. As a well-known family law treatise noted, the decline
of the right of chastisement signaled that "[t]he rule of love has superceded the rule of force."
Id. at 2143 (quoting JAMES A. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 59
(Boston; Little, Brown, & Co. 1870)); see also Fulgham, 46 Ala. at 144 (citing this principle).
77. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868).
78. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2147-48.
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criminating the other, that which ought to be forgotten in a day,
will be remembered for life.79
Absent threat of "permanent or malicious injury," the court
concluded, these matters were better left instead to "family govern-
ment." o
In creating a new protective sphere around the privacy of
domestic relations, courts, while speaking in formal, neutral terms,
acted to shield middle- and upper-class men from risking the evils
of publicity merely for the inevitable "frailties of [their] nature" and
"the mysteries of [human] passion."81 "What could be more harass-
ing to [the middle class], or injurious to society, than to draw a
crowd around their seclusion," or what could be more harmful to the
upper-class for whom "an indignity is disgrace and exposure is
ruin."82 This fear of public shame and harm to reputation resonates
with social concerns about manners, status, and the proper. code of
behavior for a gentleman.' Similar concerns about protecting
against a loss of privacy at the hands of the emerging mass media
of newspapers would eventually lead to the development of an
independent privacy tort.8
4
The practices of special domestic relations courts established by
cities during the late nineteenth century to handle complaints of
marital violence also suggest resistance to lifting the veil of privacy
to protect traditional male prerogatives.85 These courts attempted
to decriminalize physical and sexual violence in families and instead
urged reconciliation," providing counseling where possible. 7
79. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 457.
80. Id. at 459.
81. Siegel, supra note 73, at 2157-58.
82. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 458-59.
83. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2158-59 (stating that "[a] new kind of embarrassment and
sense of shame emerged (in the nineteenth century] ... one that fed upon uncertainties of
status, of belonging, of living up to often ambiguous standards of social performance in a
society in which all claims of rank were subject to challenge") (quoting JOHN F. KASSON,
RUDENESS & CIVILITY, MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA 115 (1990)).
84. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890) (stating how newspapers and photographers had "overstepp[ed] in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency" and had spread "the details of sexual
relations ... in the columns of the daily papers"); see also Kramer, supra note 60, at 715-20
(describing the development of an independent privacy tort in the wake of the famous Warren
and Brandeis essay).
85. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2170.
86. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 137-38, 142 (1987).
87. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2170; see also Pleck, supra note 73, at 44-45 (discussing
the increasing application of social casework methods to problems of family violence instead
of criminal law enforcement methods).
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Caseworkers tried to dissuade women from filing charges against
their husbands, often blaming the women for any problems at
home.' Agents investigating allegations of wife beating generally
sided with husbands.89 As one New York City judge stated, the
whole premise of specialized domestic relations courts was that
"domestic trouble cases are not criminal in a legal sense."9" Any
efforts that tended to increase the availability of separation, divorce,
child custody for women, or court-ordered support, were defeated.9'
When the state took action against marital violence, investiga-
tions tended towards the homes of poor and working-class immi-
grants. When an agent did investigate a middle-class home, he or
she usually did so with greater respect for the privacy of' the
inhabitants.92 Actual criminal prosecutions of alleged wife beaters,
though i'nfrequent, generally targeted immigrants and black men.93
Similarly, the surge of interest around the turn of the twentieth
century in punishing wife beating with the whipping post targeted
poor whites and blacks.'
b. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Just as courts resisted criminal prosecutions of wife beating in
the name of safeguarding domestic privacy, they also sought to
preclude tort suits by married wives against their husbands for
assault. The traditional common law doctrine of feme covert - that
a woman's legal identity merged with the husband's at marriage9"
88. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 38-39 (noting example of one such women who was
instructed by caseworkers to keep her home and children clean in order to command the
respect of her husband); Michael D. Rosenbaum, To Break the Shell Without Scrambling the
Egg: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Intervention into Violent Families, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 409, 412 (1998) (noting agencies devoted to providing assistance to women in
abusive relationships were criticized for breaking up marriages).
89. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 84-85.
90. Id. at 137 (quoting Judge Bernhard Rabbino of the Philadelphia Court of Domestic
Relations).
91. See id. at 107. For example, a defeated Massachusetts bill would have given an
assaulted wife the right to apply at a neighborhood police court for a legal separation. See id.
at 102-03.
92. See id. at 85.
93. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2139-40.
94. See id. at 2137-38 (noting supporters of the whipping post believed it would "deter wife
beating because it was a mode of punishment to which even the most socially depraved would
respond," and it was therefore an "efficacious means of controlling the vicious classes")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
95. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the being of
the legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage or at least
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing,
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- precluded a wife from filing any suit without her husband's
consent and joinder. 6 The doctrine of marital unity eroded during
the middle and latter half of the nineteenth century as states passed
married women's property acts allowing married women to own and
control various kinds of property (including wages), gave them the
right to sue and be sued, and generally granted them a separate
legal identity.s7 Such statutes made it plausible to argue that
women's independent legal status had replaced coverture, thereby
paving the way for interspousal tort litigation.98
No nineteenth century court, however, granted a battered
woman the right to sue her husband for damages for assault.9"
Instead, state courts effectively closed the door to such suits' 0 by
transforming the common law fiction of coverture into a substantive
common law rule of interspousal tort immunity; then concluding, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, the married women's property
acts had not abrogated that 'rule.1°1
protection and cover, she performs every thing, and is therefore called ... a
feme-covert; ... and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
For a description of the common-law doctrine of coverture, see generally Marylynn Salmon,
Equality or Submersion?: Feme Covert Status in Early Pennsylvania, in WOMEN OF AMERICA:
A HISTORY (Carol Berkin & Mary Beth Norton eds., 1979).
96. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359,364-
65 (1989) ("Unitary legal status prevented one spouse from acquiring a tort cause of action
against the other for harm perpetrated. Even if a claim could have been stated, the husband,
would have been plaintiff as well as defendant in any litigation pursued.").
97. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 51-55 (1982); see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and
Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 478 (1999). Although the married women's property acts and
earnings statutes of the nineteenth century mitigated the brutal inequalities of the common
law doctrine of coverture, they did not completely free wives from their common-law marital
status. See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127-28 (1994).
98. See Tobias, supra note 96, at 373 (noting the married women's property acts "figured
prominently in nearly every judicial determination regarding immunity until the mid-
twentieth century").
99. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 100; see also Tobias, supra note 96, at 383 ("Between
1863 and 1913, judges unanimously rejected interspousal personal injury claims.").
100. Siegel, supra note 73, at 2163-66. Husbands likewise were barred from bringing tort
actions against their wives. See Drake v. Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1920)
(barring action by husband against wife for cruel and inhuman treatment). Judicial treat-
ment of other immunities during this period, including parent-child immunity, paralleled that
of interspousal immunity. See Tobias, supra note 96, at 398 (noting that no jurisdiction
allowed intrafamily litigation).
101. See Tobias, supra note 96, at 385-92 (discussing approaches adopted by courts); see
also Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910) (interpreting the married woman's
property act of the District of Columbia as not allowing a tort action by a wife against her
husband because "such radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought by language
so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention"). For example,
a New York court interpreted the State's 1860 statute giving a married woman the right to
her earnings and the capacity to sue in contract and tort as not including a cause of action by
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As with criminal prosecutions of interspousal assault, courts
reasoned that to allow tort actions by wives for assaults by hus-
bands would jeopardize treasured domestic privacy and harmony. °2
The Tennessee Supreme Court warned that to construe a 1913 act
removing the "disabilities of coverture from married women" as
allowing a cause of action by a wife against her husband for assault
would "mak[e] public scandal of family discord, to the hurt of the
reputation of husband and wife, their families and connections."1 3
Maine's supreme court adopted a similar rationale in denying an
action by a wife against her husband for forcibly carrying her to an
insane asylum, declaring "it is better to draw the curtain, shut out
the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."104 For
similar reasons, state courts precluded contract actions by wives
against their husbands. 5 As with marital violence prosecutions,
courts feared undermining the prerogatives of middle- and upper-
class men who, with wealth, property, and reputation at stake, were
particularly vulnerable to these types of suits.106
a wife against her husband for assault and battery. Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366,
366-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863).
102. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2165-66.
103. Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 179 S.W. 628, 629 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1915); see also Drake, 177
N.W. at 625 (barring action by husband against wife for cruel and inhuman treatment; stating
that such an action would jeopardize "the welfare of the home, the abiding place of domestic
love and affection, the maintenance of which in all its sacredness, undisturbed by a public
exposure of trivial family agreements, is so essential to society").
104. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) (quoting State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62
(1874)); see also State v. Fulton, 63 S.E. 145, 145 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1908) (quashing an indictment
against a husband for slandering his wife; stating while "the harsh and cruel word that sends
a pang to the sensitive heart may be recalled, and relations that should never have been
interrupted by an unkind or unwarranted expression again restored," the "unnumbered
mischiefs that might flow from making an unguarded and false imputation upon the wife's
chastity the subject of a criminal proceeding are so obvious that we cannot think the
[legislature] intended such a possible result").
105. See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381,383 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910) (holding it would
be contrary to public policy to permit a husband and wife to contract for the provision of such
services - here, the provision of nursing services by the wife to her husband during his
illness - that "should be the natural prompting of that love and affection which should
always exist between husband and wife"); see also Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073,
1181 (1994) ("To emancipate any significant part of a wife's household labor within a regime
of separate property would be to recognize husband and wife as economic agents having
distinct and possibly antagonistic interests in marriage.").
106. See Siegel, supra note 73, at 2162-63; see also Tobias, supra note 96, at 395-96:
[An] important reason[] for the courts' resolution of the interspousal immunity
issue pertain[s] to prevailing societal images of females, wedlock, wives, and the
family. These images - of a world split into a superior, public, legalized sphere
occupied by males and an inferior, private realm without law to which women
were relegated; of females as weak, inferior beings who needed men's protection;
of marriage and the family as private, altruistic and sacred - often were
articulated expressly in the cases.
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Courts only gradually began to allow interspousal tort actions,
and were initially more likely to do so where the plaintiff alleged an
act of unusual violence or severe injury by his or her spouse, °7 or
where the alleged conduct egregiously violated prevailing social
norms, such as where a wife sued her husband for infecting her with
a venereal disease."8 Only later did courts begin to recognize inter-
spousal tort claims,' °9 after the emergence of a less patriarchal view
of marriage and of greater numbers of women in middle-class
professions and reform organizations."'
c. Spousal Evidentiary Privileges
The importance of protecting domestic privacy from the public
exposure associated with judicial proceedings was also cited as a
basis for maintaining the common law rules of evidence that barred
the testimony of one spouse for or against the other,"' and testi-
mony about confidential communications between spouses. Many
thought these privileges favored marital unity and the sanctity of
the home," 2 and that each was based ultimately on the husband's
107. See, e.g., Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 140 P. 1022,1025 (Ok. Sup. Ct. 1914) (stating that neither
"the sanctity of the home, [n]or the sacred relations of marriage, is better protected by denying
[the wife] a reasonable compensation for injuries maliciously and feloniously inflicted upon
her bya husband with a shotgun loaded with buckshot").
108. See Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1920):
[N]o principle of justice can maintain the proposition in law, or in morals, that
a debauchee, as the defendant admits himself to be can marry a virtuous girl,
and, continuing his round of dissipation, keep up his intercourse ... contracting
... venereal disease, communicate it to his wife ... subjecting her to humiliation,
and ruining her physically for life, and seeking to run off with all his property,
abandoning her to utter indigence; yet be exempted from all liability by the
assertion that he and his wife are one....
109. See Tobias, supra note 96, at 383 (noting that "[firom 1914 until 1920, jurists in seven
states allowed such actions, and a comparable number denied them. During the ensuing half
century, immunity slowly eroded. Finally, since approximately 1970, the doctrine [of
interspousal tort immunity] has been converted to a minority rule.") (footnote omitted).
110. See id. at 415-17.
111. See Margaret J. Chriss, Note, Troubling Degrees ofAuthority: The Continuing Pursuit
of Unequal Marital Roles, 12 LAW & INEQ. 225, 230, 246-47 (1993). Testimony against the
other spouse was barred by the adverse testimony privilege; testimony for the other spouse
was barred under the spousal disqualification doctrine. See id. at 230-31; see also Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980) (describing "ancient roots" of the privilege).
112. See Chriss, supra note 111, at 247; see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52:
The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege [barring a spouse from
testifying adversely] have long since disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law
world - indeed in any modern society - is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with
recognition as a whole human being.
"A MAN'S HOME IS HIS CASTLE"
authority to silence his wife.113
Like the bar on interspousal tort suits, the bar on testimony for
or against one's spouse was rooted in the single legal identity of
husband and wife under the common law principle of coverture"':
a wife could not testify against her husband because it would be like
testifying against herself."5 Conversely, courts deemed the wife
incompetent to testify for her husband because her interests were
thought to be identical to his, and no witness could testify on his or
her own behalf due to the disqualification of interest. 16 During the
latter half of the nineteenth century, many courts increasingly
justified these privileges in terms of domestic privacy and
harmony,"7 the "principles of public policy which lie at the basis of
civil society.""' Even as statutes eliminated the disqualification of
interest in witnesses, courts continued to bar a spouse from testify-
ing on behalf of the other to protect the sanctity of marital relations,
which might be jeopardized by forcing a wife to choose between "her
duty to her God and the requirements of, not to say her duty to, her
husband.""9  Similar rationales were offered for excluding the
testimony by one spouse against the other. In Owen v. State," for
example, the Alabama Supreme Court excluded the testimony of the
defendant's wife in a burglary prosecution to avoid "embarrassing
questions" that might "tear[] away the veil, which hides from public
gaze the sacred confidences which subsist between husband and
wife."' 2' There was, however, a limit to the bar on testimony against
one's spouse: a wife could still testify about a husband's violence
against her and to protect her "life and liberty."22
113. See Chriss, supra note 111, at 247.
114. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 431.
115. Chriss, supra note 111, at 230.
116. Kelley v. Proctor, 41 N.H. 139, 140 (1860) ("[Husband and wife] cannot be witnesses
for each other, because their interests are absolutely the same, and thus both are alike
excluded on the ground of interest....").
117. See John T. Hundley, "Inadvertent Waiver" of Evidentiary Privileges: Can
Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 265 n.9
(1995) (noting that the privilege "sought to preserve domestic tranquility, to assure that
nothing shall be extracted from the bosom of the wife which was confided there by the
husband") (internal citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted); see also Note, supra note
54, at 1902-03 ("The common law rule of evidence that excluded spousal testimony and
confidential communications between husband and wife, though rooted in antiquated notions
of the couple's single legal identity, acquired a new justification in the nineteenth century:
preserving 'the sacred privacy of domestic life.'") (footnote omitted).
118. Kelley, 41 N.H. at 145.
119. Id. at 143.
120. 78 Ala. 425 (1885).
121. Id. at 429-30.
122. Hundley, supra note 117, at 265 n.9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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-Similarly, courts justified maintaining the confidentiality of
communications between husband and wife on the ground it was
necessary to preserve the "peace of the household." 2' Courts vested
the confidential communications privilege in the husband, 24 which
largely functioned to prevent a witness-wife from testifying against
her defendant-husband.'25 An influential treatise described the
social significance of the privilege:
[I]t is essential to the happiness of social life that the confidence
subsisting between husband and wife should be sacredly
protected and cherished in its most unlimited extent; and to
break down or impair the great principles which protect the
sanctities of that relation would be to destroy the best solace of
human existence. 126
Only when these "sacred confidences" were themselves violated
might a court find the confidential communication privilegedid not
apply. For example, in People v. Hayes,27 the court held the
privilege had been waived where a husband gave letters to his
mistress who in turn gave them to his wife because the husband's
conduct violated "honor and decency" - an egregious breach of
social convention that trumped the court's desire to protect private
communications between husband and wife.12' Thus, like courts'
response to marital violence prosecutions and interspousal tort
suits, their justification of spousal evidentiary privileges suggests
how the law reflected the moral sentiments of the age and helped
ensure that a man's home remained his castle.
29
A series of landmark Supreme Court search and seizure
decisions beginning in the late 1880s also expressed the link
between the home and privacy. In defining the limits on the scope
123. Stanford v. Murphy, 63 Ga. 410, 416 (1879).
124. See Chriss, supra note 111, at 252.
125. See id. at 226.
126. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 334-35 (1899).
127. 140 N.Y. 484 (1894).
128. Id. at 496; see also State v. Wallace, 78 S.E. 1, 3-4 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1913) (explaining rule
that privilege was waived where the confidential communication had been disclosed to a third
party to avoid causing "implacable discord and dissension between the husband and wife, and
a means of great inconvenience") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
129. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-52 (1980) (noting Jeremy Bentham's
criticism that the confidential communications privilege went far "beyond making every man's
house his castle," enabling a person to "convert his house into a den of thieves") (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the Supreme Court in Trammel modified the adverse
testimony privilege by making it the witness spouse's choice alone whether to testify
adversely, it did not disturb its previous recognition of the confidential communications
privilege. See id. at 45 n.5, 53.
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of law enforcement activities, the Court issued sweeping proclama-
tions about the home's unique place in law and society.
C. The Development of Fourth Amendment Law and the Home
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded
the home's constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment.
For most of the nineteenth century, federal search and seizure law
was not that significant.13 ° Federal prosecutions were rare, and
were the only ones in which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
applied. 3' Moreover, the search incident to arrest doctrine and
pretrial questioning helped ensure the government could obtain
evidence from the accused in most criminal cases without raising
substantial constitutional issues.'32 As the scope of economic
regulation increased, and as law enforcement developed new, more
intrusive methods of investigation, Fourth Amendment litigation
increased, requiring the.Court to resolve conflicts between individ-
ual liberty and the needs of law enforcement.3 3 Property rights and
principles of common law trespass, which traditionally provided an
important basis for protecting the home against unlawful intrusions
by public officials,3 3 helped shape the development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 35 and strengthened the historic tie
between the home and privacy. 36
1. Boyd and the Expansion of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure
The Supreme Court's 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States 37
marked the beginning of judicial resistance to increased federal
130. See Stuntz, supra note 42, at 419.
131. See id.; see also Kramer, supra note 60, at 705 (arguing that initially "the [F]ourth
[A]mendment applied only to a small percentage of privacy invasions and did not secure an
individual's right to be let alone []) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See Stuntz, supra note 42, at 420.
133. See Brian S. Schultz, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and the Right to Financial
Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 787 (1999).
134. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
135. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (2001) ("[W]ell into the
20th century, [the Supreme Court's] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-
law trespass."); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 998
(1982) ("The [F]ourth [A]mendment historically was thought of in terms of protecting
property."); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
136. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1357-60 (describing the link between privacy and the
Fourth Amendment).
137. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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regulation. 3 ' The government permitted Boyd, a contractor supply-
ing glass used in the construction of federal buildings, to import
some of the glass duty free. Boyd claimed that some initial
shipments suffered considerable breakage and brought in later
shipments duty free to compensate. The government disagreed and
commenced forfeiture proceedings.'39 The Court held that enforce-
ment of a subpoena ordering the production of Boyd's business
records - the invoices for the glass shipments - violated the
Fourth Amendment. 4 ° The Court stated for a search and seizure to
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the government's title
to the property seized had to be superior to that of the person from
whom the government took the property.' Because Boyd's papers
were his "dearest property,"4  the government could not justify its
trespass onto that property.'43 This principle, stated the Court,
applied to all invasions by the government into "the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of his life."'" In sweeping language,
the Court linked the protection of property and privacy under the
Fourth Amendment, 45 suggesting the powerful pull of property
rights on constitutional jurisprudence during this period. 46
138. See Davies, supra note 22, at 726.
139. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18.
140. See id. at 633-34. The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination precluded the government from seizing and using as evidence books and
papers that might incriminate their owner. See id.
141. See id. at 623.
142. Id. at 627-28 ("Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property, and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection....")
(quoting Howell's State Trials, supra note 43, at 1066).
143. See id. at 627-29. The idea that only the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime were
subject to seizure, and not an individual's property that was merely evidence of a crime, later
would become known as the "mere evidence rule." See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 309 (1921); see also The Supreme Court, 1966 Term: Highlights of the Term, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 112, 113 (1967) (discussing the origins of the "mere evidence rule"). Under later
development of the doctrine, the degree of the government's property interest determined
what items were lawfully subject to seizure. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951 n.48 (1977). The "mere
evidence" rule was not officially overruled until 1967. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
144. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
145. Id.
It is not the breaking of[a man's] doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence,... which
underlies the essence of Lord Camden's judgment [in Entick v. Carrington].
Id.
146. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 221-22 (1993); Note, supra note 143, at 948-49 ("The Supreme
Court's [F]ourth and [F]ifth [A]mendment[s] decisions in the late nineteenth and early
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Although the Court limited the potential scope of Boyd's
application in subsequent decisions involving the regulation of
businesses and corporations,'47 it nonetheless reaffirmed the
connection between the Fourth Amendment and private property
insofar, as the issue involved an allegedly unlawful search and
seizure of an individual's home.
In Weeks v. United States,'" the Court held the Constitution
mandated the exclusion of personal papers seized in a warrantless
search of the home of a defendant convicted of transporting
gambling materials through the mails.'49 Thus, the exclusionary
rule in federal cases was born in the search of a home. In Gouled v.
United States,' the Court held the seizure of papers by a govern-
ment agent who gained admission to defendant's office by pretend-
ing to make a "friendly call" violated the Fourth Amendment.'5 ' In
Olmstead v. United States,'52 the Court held electronic surveillance
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no "actual
physical invasion of [the defendant's] house or curtilage,"' 5 ' nor any
property interest in intangible conversations.'
After Olmstead, the Court gradually moved away from this
mechanical, property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment, 5
eventually jettisoning it for a more fluid approach based on an
twentieth century can best be understood in light of the prevailing currents of legal thought
during that era, an era which has become known as the formalist period of American legal
thought.").
147. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906) (holding that corporations do not
have a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the right applies only
to natural persons; however, permitting the corporation to challenge the government's seizure
of corporate records on Fourth Amendment grounds); see Note, supra note 143, at 956.
Limiting Boyd's scope was necessary if the growing efforts to regulate business were to have
any hope of success. See also Stuntz, supra note 42, at 422-23, 433, 445.
148. 232 U.S. 383, 390-92 (1914) (describing the connection between the sanctity of private
property and the Fourth Amendment in adopting the exclusionary rule for unlawful searches
and seizures by federal officials).
149. See id. at 393.
150. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
151. Id. at 305-06.
152. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
153. Id. at 466 (internal quotations omitted); cf. id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting) (agreeing
case should be decided on property rights grounds; but concluding that there are property
rights in both intangible conversations and telephone wires).
154. See id. at 464.
155. See Note, supra note 143, at 964-65 (noting that by the 1930s, the legal realism
approach based on social policy had largely displaced the formalist approach to the Fourth
Amendment). The Supreme Court's formalist approach to the Fourth Amendment had been
previously attacked by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead. 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Fourth Amendment protects personal privacy
over private property; extolling "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men").
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individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.156 While the home
would eventually protect "people, not places,"157 the sanctity of
property rights has continued to underlie the home's privileged
status under the Fourth Amendment to this day.1 58
Ultimately, the home would come to embody not only the
sanctity of private property, but also a "unique combination of
values" expressed in the exercise of protected individual liberties in
marriage and marital relations, family and childbearing, and
education and school. 59 This was a far broader range of activities
than Boyd's vision of private business correspondence embodying
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." 6° The
incorporation of the maxim that a "man's home is his castle" into the
fabric of constitutional search and seizure doctrine demonstrated
156. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing test later adopted by the majority); see also Gormley, supra note 18, at 1362 ("[Ilt
was not until the events of history coalesced to make [new technological inventions used in
police investigations] a matter ... of fundamental concern on a societal scale ... that Fourth
Amendment privacy took shape in American jurisprudence."). The view that the Fourth
Amendment should be tied to property rights still attracts support. Minnesota v Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that law of arrest and trespass underlying
the Fourth Amendment made 'every man's house ... his own castle," but not "the castle of
another man") (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
158. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
("Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable
surveillance.") (citing Katz v. United States); Mary B. Spector, Crossing the Threshold:
Examining the Abatement of Public Nuisances Within the Home, 31 CONN. L. REV. 547, 568
(1999) ("Although it is clear that the (First] Amendment "'protects people, not places,' the
individual's expectation of privacy is generally greater the more closely related it is to the
home.") (footnote omitted); see also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,62 (1992) (holding that
removal of a mobile home from a rented lot could constitute "seizure" under Fourth
Amendment because that Amendment "protects property as well as privacy"). See generally
Radin, supra note 135, at 999-1000 (noting the continuing influence of private property on the
Fourth Amendment, particularly the sanctity of the home, even after the Court's decision in
Katz).
159. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a state
statute forbidding the sale, distribution, and use of contraceptives because it
unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy); see Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (invalidating statute prohibiting the mere private possession of obscene
materials in one's home; noting that "[wihatever may be the justifications for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home"); Spector,
supra note 158, at 567 (citing landmark Supreme Court decisions); see also Radin, supra note
135, at 997 ("[The] home is a place where intimate things are kept from prying eyes and
intimate relationships are carried on away from prying ears."); cf. Gormley, supra note 18, at
1340 (stating that "privacy in the United States has led a similar vine-like existence, creating
a variety of different offshoots depending upon the particular climate of American life").
160. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886); see also Kramer, supra note 60, at 705
(noting that at the time of Boyd the Fourth Amendment "actually protected very few
privacies").
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the sanctity of property rights, as well as the seeds of a more 'far-
reaching development that recognized "the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect." 6'
Prohibition era cases also demonstrate the privileged treatment
of the home. While the power of government officials to conduct
searches and seizures expanded rapidly with the passage of
Prohibition laws beginning in the states and culminating in the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, efforts by law enforce-
ment officials to root out the evils of alcohol did not deprive the
home of its traditional protection.
2. Prohibition and the Privacy of the Home
The passage of Prohibition laws in various states, and the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919,162 sparked an
explosion of litigation over the scope of legitimate searches and
seizures of private homes and businesses." The sharp rise in
litigation challenging searches and seizures promopted much
comment and debate in legal jburnals.'" It also led to increased
judicial scrutiny of law enforcement activity, including searches of
private homes by government agents. 6 ' These cases not only reflect
how the home largely retained its unique status, but also suggest
how assumptions about gender shaped courts' understanding of the
home and privacy.
161. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI. The Volstead Act, which implemented the Eighteenth Amendment,
prohibited the manufacture, sale, barter, transport, import, export, delivery, or possession of
an intoxicating liquor except for medicinal or religious purposes. See also National
Prohibition Act, Volstead Act, ch. 85, § 1, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by ch. 740, tit. 1, § 1,
49 Stat. 872 (1935).
163. See, e.g., Glenn D. Roberts, Does the Search and Seizure Clause Hinder the Proper
Administration of the Criminal Justice?, 5 WIS. L. REV. 195, 198 (1929) (discussing the
frequent challenges to the enforcement of Prohibition in Little Italy); see also id. at 197
(noting in certain areas as many as thirty warrants were issued in single day to undercover
the illegal sale of liquors).
164. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555,602 n.218 (1996) (citing numerous
scholarly commentary).
165. See, e.g., Rayman L. Solomon, Regulating the Regulators: Prohibition Enforcement in
the Seventh Circuit, in LAW, ALCOHOL AND ORDER 93-94 (David E. Kyvig ed., 1985) (stating
that a study of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit shows
the "lawlessness and irresponsibility of these Prohibition agents challenged the integrity of
the regulatory process itself, and the judges intervened and refused to sanction it").
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a. Constitutional Litigation
Federal Prohibition law treated the home with particular
deference. The Volstead Act, which implemented national Prohibi-
tion,166 not only barred issuance of a warrant to search "any private
dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful
sale of intoxicating liquor,"16 v but also provided for criminal
sanctions against any officer who conducted such an unlawful
search.16 Many cases invalidating liquor seizures involved "private
dwellings," 169 defined by statute to include rooms "occupied not
transiently but solely as a residence." 7'
Even when courts initially upheld Prohibition searches and
seizures against legal challenges, 7' they reaffirmed the sanctity of
the home and distinguished searches for illegal liquors in' private
homes, from those in open fields172 and automobiles. 173 The majority
of state courts that adopted a rule excluding unconstitutionally
seized evidence - a rule required under the Constitution only in
federal cases at the time 74 - did so in Prohibition cases involving
searches of private homes (or businesses).1 75 The growing unpopu-
166. See supra note 162.
167. Volstead Act § 25, 41 Stat. at 315; see also United States v. Maggio, 51 F.2d 397, 398
(W.D.N.Y. 1931) (contrasting the act's treatment of possession of liquor in a private dwelling
with its treatment of the transportation of liquor in large quantities in a truck).
168. See Supplemental Act to National Prohibition Act, 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1923).
169. See, e.g., Maggio, 51 F.2d at 398.
170. Volstead Act § 25, 41 Stat. at 315.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Two Soaking Units, 48 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1931)
(upholding warrantless seizure of beer where officers had the permission of the owner "to
enter and inspect the premises"), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 626 (1931); People v. 100-Gallon Stills,
197 N.Y.S. 882, 883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922) (refusing to dismiss forfeiture proceeding because
of technical defect in warrant); see also Paul L. Murphy, Societal Morality and Individual
Freedom, in LAW, ALCOHOL, AND ORDER 74 (David E. Kyvig ed., 1985) ("By accepting
surreptitious trespass on the property of private citizens as a natural incident of the effective
enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, the [Supreme Court] indicated that it - like the
general public - had not yet developed serious reservations about techniques of Prohibition
enforcement.").
172. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding "the special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects,' is not extended to the open fields" surrounding one's home; noting that "[t]he
distinction between [open fields] and the house is as old as the common law").
173. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,153 (1925) (upholding a warrantless search
of an automobile for illegal liquor; distinguishing such searches from those of the home, which
were entitled to greater constitutional protection).
174. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Adams v. People, 192
U.S. 585, 595-96 (1904).
175. See, e.g., Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43 (1922) (finding warrantless seizure of several
bottles filled with liquor from the defendant's home); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,
153 (1920) (noting seizure of "several gallons of whiskey" from a small house near the
defendant's residence); People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559 (1919) (noting seizure of liquor
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larity of Prohibition," 6 strongest among the immigrant under-
class,'77 and concern about overzealous law enforcement, helped lead
to the appointment of a presidential commission,'78 and to the closer
judicial scrutiny of law enforcement. Courts became more willing
to invalidate Prohibition searches and seizures,'79 at least where the
violation was not flagrant or commercialized. 8 °
b. Prohibition, Gender, and Privacy
Prohibition enforcement cases also suggest that prevailing
notions about gender influenced courts' treatment of the home. One
issue courts confronted was whether a wife's consent waived her
from the defendant's home); Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211 (1922) (noting warrantless seizure
of "a still and a quantity of distilled whisky" from the defendant's home and premises); State
v. Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 721 (1922) (noting arrest for "one quart of red whiskey and one
pint of moonshine whiskey"); see also Sanford E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and
Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and
Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 472 n.78 (1986) (noting the
majority of cases in which state courts adopted the exclusionary rule involved alleged
violations of the Prohibition laws.
176. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 214 N.Y.S. 187, 190 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1926) ("[Prohibition] is
branded unpopular. All classes - statesman, scholar, merchant, and workman - have joined
without cover or concealment in its violation."), rev'd on other grounds, 217 N.Y.S. 486 (N.Y.
App. Term. 1926); Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference
Does Legalization Make?, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 624 (1994) ("By craving an outlawed drug,
almost the entire country engaged in illicit behavior."). Additionally, liquor taxes provided
a major source of federal revenue by the late nineteenth century, thus complicating the efforts
to eliminate the production and sale of alcohol. See W.J. Rorabaugh, Book Review, Reexam-
ining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 290 (1996) (noting that by the
1890s, liquor taxes constituted approximately forty percent of all federal revenue).
177. See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 17-18 (1995).
178. See ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FORJUSTICE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL
STATE 355 (1991) (discussing how widespread flouting of Prohibition caused President Hoover
to appoint the Wickersham Commission to study the problem).
179. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN
INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 74 (1994) ("As public opposition to Prohibition grew,
the Court increasingly construed the Fourth Amendment to impose strict limits on those
charged with enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment."); Paul L. Murphy, supra note 171, at 76
(noting that courts demonstrated an increasing concern for the rights of the individual); see
also O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1931) (reversing conviction where
evidence indicated that the government agents had entrapped the defendant; stating that "[i]f
the conduct of [the government] be unconscionable, if it be intentionally deceptive and design-
ed to induce, and does induce another to do something which he would not otherwise have
done, the wrongdoer is not and should not be permitted to profit thereby"); Miucki v. United
States 289 F. 47 (7th Cir. 1923) (reversing conviction where agents entered defendants' busi-
ness, a "soft-drink parlor," without a warrant and remanding the case for a determination of
admissibility of evidence seized from a cash drawer in light of the possibility that the defen-
dants' alleged consent to the warrantless search was obtained by pointing a gun at them).
180. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding wiretapping of office of
defendant, a rogue police lieutenant who had accumulated a fortune as a bootlegger, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
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husband's privilege from a warrantless search.'81 In Amos v. United
States,8 2 the Supreme Court held the presence of government
officials created a situation of implied coercion, invalidating any
purported waiver by a wife. It declined to reach the issue of whether
a wife could ever waive her husband's Fourth Amendment right
against a warrantless search. 83 A number of state courts sub-
sequently invalidated warrantless searches based on a wife's
purported consent." The mere fact government agents had been
polite, one court reasoned, did not eliminate the coercion inherent
in these searches.'85 Several federal courts went further, holding in
Prohibition cases that, as a matter of law, a wife could not waive her
husband's constitutional right to be free from warrantless
searches.'
Thus, while Prohibition era cases generally reinforce the home's
privileged status in constitutional search and seizure law, they also
suggest how closely tied notions of domestic privacy were to male
prerogatives, including the ownership of property. The remainder
of this Article explores in greater detail how gender, as well as class
and race, shaped the home's treatment.
II. CHILD WELFARE AND THE REGULATION OF THE HOME AND
FAMILY
In America, the traditional view of the family had been as an
autonomous and self-regulating institution, a community in its own
right,'87 insulated from state interference absent some deviation
181. See generally Searches and Seizures: Effect on Husband of Wife's Consent to an
Unreasonable Search of their Home in Husband's Absence, 9 TENN. L. REV. 64 (1930)
(discussing the strict construction of the voluntariness of waiver in Prohibition-era search and
seizure cases).
182. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
183. See id. at 317. The view of a wife's inability to consent to a search predates
Prohibition era cases. See, e.g., Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464, 473 (1850) (stating that a wife's
authority extended to "rendering the ordinary civilities of life" but not to consenting to a
search by government officials, because "[an artful man might impose on the wife in the
absence of her husband, and thus, for malicious and unlawful purposes obtain from her a
license to search the desk and private papers of her husband").
184. See, e.g., Meredeth v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 705 (1926) (holding the mere presence
of officers is enough to imply coercion); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 841 (1923); State
v. Bonolo, 270 P. 1065 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1928).
185. See Byrd v. State, 30 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1930) ("The force of a demand by one
plainly in a position to enforce it is not weakened by being given the form of an invitation.").
186. See Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930); United States v. Rykowski, 267
F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920) (stating that a wife had no implied authority in the absence of her
husband).
187. See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (1986).
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from the republican ideal. 1" Nevertheless, the great social changes
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries altered this
conception of the home. Urbanization, industrialization, and mass
immigration transformed the nation's landscape,8 9 sparking fears
its homes and families were being undermined and endangering the
entire social order.' 9° There was a growing consensus that the era's
main social problems, including crime, poverty, and disease, could
be addressed at the level of the family. Reformers expressed
increasing concern about divorce, desertions, permissive child
rearing, and the increasing "restless[ness]" of women in their role
as homemakers. 19' Scholars even discussed concerns about prostitu-
tion in terms of changes in family life.'92 Many saw the home -
"the sacred, the holy word Home "193 - as both the primary source
of social problems and the key to their solution.
As a result, government regulation of the home expanded
into areas previously considered exclusively within the bounds
of a family's autonomy,"9 such as the institution of various
controls on marriage 95 and the regulation of reproductive
188. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25-29 (1985); see also State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457
(1868) ("Every household has and must have, a government of its own, modeled to suit the
temper, disposition and condition of its inmates."); JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH:
FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 67-70 (1970) (describing how in colonial Plymouth,
Massachusetts, the home was viewed as "a little commonwealth" in which the master - the
husband - ruled the members - his wife, children, and servants - while also representing
them in the outside World); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 108,
109 (describing the family as something more than a mere contract).
189. See, e.g., David Donald, Foreword to WIEBE, supra note 19, at vii-viii; CASHMAN, supra
note 20, at 103; see also JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH, 1870-1890, at 179-80
(discussing the rapid expansion in cities and in the numbers of foreign immigrants during this
period); HOFSTADTER, supra note 19, at 175 ("The age resounds with the warnings of prophets
like Josiah Strong that the city, if not somehow tamed, would bring with it the downfall of the
nation."). Between 1890 and 1914, the nature of the immigration shifted; whereas before a
majority of immigrants came from northern and western Europe, during this period a
majority came from southern and eastern Europe. CASHMAN, supra note 20, at 87 (noting that
by the early twentieth century, "the 'old' immigration was ... much smaller than the 'new'").
190. See Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American
Family Law, 1890-1900,28 IND. L. REV. 273,275 (1995) (describing the "moral panic" over the
family).
191. DEMOS, supra note 187, at 30.
192. See RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION INAMERICA, 1900-1918, at 44-
45 (1982).
193. STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 132 (1992) (quoting a reformer).
194. See Grossberg, supra note 190, at 276.
195. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 103-09 (describing states' attempts to institute
minimum age requirements, term fraudulent those marriages where one party was impotent,
and prevent marriages on grounds of kinship ties, disease, mental incompetence, and the
interracial background of the prospective spouses).
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freedom."9 The traditional notion of the family as an independent,
autonomous, and self-regulating entity, ruled by a patriarch and
free from outside interference,197 was gradually supplanted by a new
image of the family as constellation of individuals ruled directly by
the state.9 '
This changing view of the home is demonstrated powerfully by
the design and administration of several major social reform
initiatives, such as the child welfare movement, financial assistance
to single mothers or "mothers' pensions," and tenement housing
regulation. Although women, the poor, and immigrants never had
been entirely free from outside intervention by reformers, the
intervention became more extensive, formalized, and specialized
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."' In the
process, gender, class, and race influenced the conception and
treatment of the home, presenting a stark contrast to the vision of
man's home that permeated other areas of law during this time.
This Article turns first to the rise of the child protection movement.
A. State Regulation of Children and the Family
In the late nineteenth century, children and the family became
a predominant focus of social reformers.2' The passage of compul-
sory education laws,2' and laws regulating the hours and conditions
of child labor,20 2 increased the role of the government in affairs
previously considered within the exclusive domain of the family.
196. See id. at 193.
197. See id. at 25-29.
198. See id. at 304-05.
199. See COONTZ, supra note 193, at 127-28.
200. See, eg., LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 27-28 (1988) (describing the increasing focus on
children as a potential threat to maintaining the social order).
201. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 130 (1986) (noting that by 1900, almost two-thirds of all states had such
laws).
202. See id. at 131; see also GARRATY, supra note 189, at 173 ("Poverty compelled many
parents to put children to work in violation of child-labor laws."). Courts, however, were
reluctant to regulate work, including child labor, in homes, because "no matter how squalid
the tenement, the home was still a man's castle." Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor
Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1017 (1999); cf. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 99 (N.Y. 1885)
(declaring unconstitutional an act "prohibiting the manufacture of cigars and preparation of
tobacco in any form in tenement houses"). As a result, those who sought regulation of labor
in the home justified it "on the ground that conditions in the homes were a menace to public
health." Goldstein et al., supra note 202, at 1017 n.117 (quoting FREDERICK SMITH HALL,
FORTY YEARS, 1902-1940, THE WORK OF THE NEW YORK CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE 83-84
(1943)).
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Efforts aimed at reducing neglect, dependency, and delinquency
represented an even more direct and dramatic incursion into
familial privacy and autonomy. While the emphasis shifted towards
ensuring the best interests of the child and keeping families intact
despite poverty, caseworkers and newly created juvenile courts
sought to achieve these ends through highly intrusive forms of inter-
vention and supervision. Meanwhile, the number of children remov-
ed from their homes and placed in institutions continued to grow.
1. The Early Child Protection Movement and the Removal of
Children from their Homes
States, acting under their parens patriae power," 3 historically
could place poor, orphaned, delinquent or abandoned children -
particularly delinquent children - in almshouses, and place poor
families in poorhouses.2" During the 1870s and 1880s, there was
a growing emphasis on placing children in institutions. Newly
created Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCCs),
along with local officials and private charity organizations like New
York's Children's Aid Society (CAS), sought to remove children from
"unfit homes" and place them in orphan asylums or foster homes. °5
While the state was initially motivated in these efforts by a desire
to prevent crime and delinquency,0 6 they focused increasingly on
203. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotes and citations omitted):
[Parens patriae] refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian
of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child
custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the
interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody
from their parents. It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those
quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people,
interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.
Theparens patriae power was often codified by statute. See, e.g., In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482,
485 (1899) (discussing section of New York State's penal code providing that any child under
the age of sixteen years may be committed if that child is found "[niot having any home or
other place of abode or proper guardianship; or who has been abandoned or improperly
exposed or neglected, by its parents or other person or persons having it in charge, or being
in a state of want or suffering; or ... destitute of means of support").
204. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 32; PLECK, supra note 86, at 74-75; see also
GORDON, supra note 200, at 55 (discussing how "child-savers" -traditionally focused their
efforts on those children reliant on the public or community for support); Jane C. Murphy,
Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and
Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 702 (1998) (noting that American colonies
"specifically authorized magistrates to 'b[i]nd out' or indenture children of the poor over
parental objections") (citation omitted).
205. See generally PLECK, supra note 86, at 74-75; KATZ, supra note 201, at 106.
206. Corinne Schiff, Student Research, Child Custody and the Ideal of Motherhood in Late
Nineteenth Century New York, 4 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 406, 412-13 (1997); Pleck, supra
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poverty, abuse, and neglect by parents." 7 The targets of this new
interventionist zeal were usually poor and immigrant families. This
new child protection movement reflected a dramatically different
approach and conception of the home than that previously de-
scribed.
a. Development and Growth of SPCCs
Members formed the first SPCC in New York in 1874 following
public outcry over the story of a physically and emotionally abused
foster child named Mary Ellen Wilson."' The next year, New York
enacted legislation "that authorized cruelty societies to file com-
plaints for the violation of any laws affecting children and required
law enforcement ... of these laws,"" 9 thereby creating the first
statutory child protective services system in the country.210 By
1880, members established thirty-three SPCCs; 211 by 1914, that
number had grown to 494.212 Although SPCCs were private
agencies that did not operate institutions, they possessed enormous
power. They could investigate allegations of child abuse and
neglect, arrest and prosecute parents, and either turn children over
to the appropriate authority213 or be appointed guardian over
children themselves.214 SPCCs also commanded the assistance of
the police and possessed standing to sue in court.1 5
note 73, at 36 (describing the growing perception that family violence was linked to the rise
in violent crime); see also Schiff, supra, at 412 (noting that the CAS's president Charles Loring
Brace focused on the "dangerous classes" of 20,000 to 30,000 homeless and vagrant children
in New York City, whom he blamed for rising crime) (quoting CHARLES LORING BRACE, THE
DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK 372 (1872)).
207. Schiff, supra note 206, at 413.
208. See Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1397, 1424-27 (1999). The evidence at trial demonstrated that Mary Ellen had been beaten,
routinely locked in a bedroom, forced to sleep on the floor, and prohibited from playing with
other children. See Jill D. Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis:
Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2066-67 (1995)
(finding the "mother" caretaker of the child was convicted and sentenced to one-year hard
labor but the "father" caretaker was not prosecuted); Mangold, supra, at 1426-27.
209. Act for the Incorporation of Societies for the Prevention ofCruelty to Children, ch. 130,
1875 N.Y. Laws 65, quoted in Moore, supra note 208, at 2068.
210. See Moore, supra note 208, at 2068.
211. See Mangold, supra note 208, at 1427.
212. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 69.
213. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 108-09; Rosenbaum, supra note 88, at 411.
214. See GORDON, supra note 200, at 50-51 (describing the powers of the Massachusetts
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children); Schiff, supra note 206, at 414 (noting that
by 1890, the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children had substantial
control over the "reception, care, and disposition" of approximately 15,000 children).
215. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 109.
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The activities of the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC) demonstrate the dramatic impact
these agencies had on families. In its first eighteen years, the
NYSPCC investigated almost 70,000 complaints of ill treatment of
209,000 children; it pursued prosecution in 24,500 of these cases,
leading to nearly 24,000 convictions and to the removal of 36,300
children from their parents.216 Elbridge T. Gerry, NYSPCC's
influential founder and president, described the law enforcement
spirit that imbued the NYSPCC and other such societies:
The SPCC was simply created as a hand affixed to the arm of
the law, by which the body politic reaches out and enforces the
law. The arm of the law seizes the child when it is in an atmo-
sphere of impurity, or in the care of those who are not fit to be
entrusted with it, wrenches the child out of these surroundings,
brings it to the court, and submits it to the decision of the court
- unless, on the other hand, it reaches out that arm of the law
to the crueliest[sic], seizes him within its grasp, brings him also
to the criminal court and insures his prosecution and punish-
ment. These are the functions of our societies.217
Partly because of the NYSPCC's efforts, the number of children
removed from their homes and placed in institutions in New York
between 1875 and 1900 increased 139 percent.218
The drive to break apart families represents a dramatic shift
from the traditional view of the family - even poor or immigrant
families - as largely free from outside interference. SPCCs and
other child protection agencies believed to end the suffering of "poor
and unfortunate" children, and to prevent their becoming "mature
criminals,"219 such children would have to be separated permanently
from their parents 220 and placed in institutions where they would
216. William Pryor Letchworth, The History of Child-Saving Work in the State of New York,
in HISTORY OF CHILD SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES 154, 199 (Report of the Comm. on the
Hist. of Child-Saving Work, 1893), cited in Schiff, supra note 206, at 413.
217. Mangold, supra note 208, at 1428 (quoting speech of Elbridge Gerry at the Thirty-first
Annual Meeting of the American Humane Society in 1907).
218. See Schiff, supra note 206, at 414. The SPCCs' power to place children in institutions
led one leader of the child protection movement to deride them as "feeders of institutions."
Id. (quoting Homer Folks).
219. NEw YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNUAL REPORT
8 (1895) (statement of president Elbridge T. Gerry), quoted in Schiff, supra note 206 at 413;
see also Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get
Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 405 (1999) (discussing the
Gerry speech).
220. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 106.
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receive "the proper instruction."22' According to the author of a
study on the supposed heredity of pauperism: "I would make alms-
houses in which there should be a separation of families. I would
say to a man and woman, if you cannot support your family, you
must be kept separate, that there shall be no more children born."222
The activities of the SPCCs and similar agencies also reflected
a social clash between native-born, middle-class reformers22 and the
"dangerous classes" of poor immigrants22 who prompted fears of
social fragmentation,22' even race suicide.226 For example, investiga-
tors for the Massachusetts Society for the Protection of Children
(MSPCC) frequently lamented the drunkenness and cultural
inferiority of immigrants and the inability of immigrant mothers to
bring up their children "according to American standards."22 ' Even
if reformers did not intend to repress poor immigrants,22' they often
did so inadvertently by imposing their own norms of family life on
them.229
The accomplishment of the goals of the child protection move-
ment led to an acceptance of the kind of sweeping investigations of
private homes that were fundamentally at odds with the judicial
exaltations of the home's sanctity in other settings. The relevant
statutes allowed SPCCs wide discretion in their enforcement
2 0
because they authorized removal on ambiguous grounds, such as the
221. Id. at 108 (quoting one county official).
222. Id. (quoting R. L. Dugdale).
223. See Schiff, supra note 206, at 413 (noting that the members of the NYSPCC were
mainly "humane persons of social position" and its leadership consisted largely of wealthy,
white Protestant males such as Cornelius Vanderbilt and Peter Cooper) (quoting the
NYSPCC's president, Elbridge Gerry).
224. See WIEBE, supra note 19, at 62 ("All the great problems..., the liquor question, the
public school question..., are tied up with the one great question of foreign immigration.")
(quoting nativist Robert DeCourey).
225. See, e.g., CASHMAN, supra note 20, at 114 ("Immigration was beginning to divide the
American society. A great gulf was opening between a predominantly native plutocracy and
a predominantly foreign working class.").
226. See, e.g., HOFSTADTER, supra note 19, at 178-79 (describing view of Edward A. Ross
that immigrants, especially those from southern and eastern Europe "bred in such numbers
that they were increasingly dominant over the native stock and thus threatened to overwhelm
'American blood' and bastardize American civilization").
227. GORDON, supra note 200, at 47.
228. See, e.g., Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1970); see also PLECK, supra note 86, at 70 (stating SPCCs were motivated
not merely by a humanitarian desire to protect children from cruelty, but also by the fear
among the wealthy, native-born urban elite of social disorder caused by the immigrant,
largely Catholic, poor).
229. See COONTZ, supra note 193, at 128, 320 n.14.
230. See Schiff, supra note 206, at 413-14.
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failure to provide "proper guardianship.""' For example, MSPCC
agents would act as:
[D]etectives, looking for absconded fathers, finding runaway or
lost children, verifying addresses, checking marriage, death,
birth, and divorce certificates.... Agents [of the MSPCC] visited
homes late at night or early in the morning - at times calcu-
lated to find wrongdoing. Unable to gain entry, they climbed in
windows. They searched without warrants. Their case notes
frequently revealed that they made their judgments first and
looked for evidence later.232
In their zeal, MSPCC agents often showed little respect for the
privacy of poor families,2 3 or even for the law when it stood in their
path.2" Although they purported to act as "friendly visitors,"
MSPCC agents more accurately served as police officers 5 Not sur-
prisingly, SPCCs - labeled "the Cruelty" by the poor in Philadel-
phia 216 - sparked fear and resistance among the families they
targeted.237
b. Dependency, Separate Spheres, and the Dynamics of
Intervention by Child Protection Agencies
The investigations and removal of children by child protection
agencies like the SPCCs demonstrate how the home's privacy
diminished in a climate of poverty and dependency. Child protec-
tion workers attributed the plight of poor parents to a lack of the
cardinal virtues of "will, work ethic, thrift, responsibility, and
honesty,"23 and believed that the government should place children
in homes that "most closely approximated the republican ideal of a
socially beneficial family."239  Thus, the poor, by virtue of their
poverty, forfeited the general presumption of parental authority, the
231. 1877 N.Y. Laws, ch. 428 § 3.
232. GORDON, supra note 200, at 48.
233. Id. (citations omitted).
234. See id. at 54 ("If indiscrete zeal,' which is made such a bugbear, occasionally leads us
into mistakes, the public will condone the error.") (quoting an MSPCC agent).
235. See id. at 48, 55 ("[MSPCC agents] called people to their office with letters that
sounded like legal summonses...[,] threatened families with arrest or with taking custody of
children...[,] searched homes, confiscated unacceptable objects, such as liquor bottles, and
ejected 'unwholesome' visitors").
236. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 109.
237. Id. One SPCC tactic that poor families found particularly troubling was that of
encouraging neighbors to spy on one another. See id.
238. GORDON, supra note 200, at 62.
239. GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 267.
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right to exclude others from their homes, and the right to raise their
children as they saw fit.2 40 Courts regularly found for the public
authority in adjudicating allegations of abuse and neglect. 41 One
reformer underscored the connection between dependency and the
lack of parental rights by explaining that "[i]mprudent and indolent
parents often make their large family the pretext for out-door aid.
When such parents fail to discharge their duty to their children
their right of possession terminates and the children become wards
of the state."
242
The poor were more vulnerable to intervention by child
protection workers not only because of economic conditions, but also
because changing views of gender roles. The late nineteenth
century saw a growing belief in the notion of separate spheres,
dividing women, children, and the home on the one hand, and men
and work on the other. The mother, now the primary parent, also
became the guardian of domestic virtue, while the father, once an
important parental figure, saw his role reduced to the breadwinner
and provider24 3 who alone sustained his wife and children by
earning the "family wage."2' While the new ideal of motherhood
and of women's roles dramatically shifted the balance of power to
women in custody disputes,2 45 it also opened the door to greater
240. See generally KATZ, supra note 201, at 108.
241. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 267.
242. KATZ, supra note 201, at 108 (quoting Proceedings of the Convention of the
Superintendents of the Poor ... held at Poghkeepsie June 8-9, 1875 (Albany, N.Y.) (statement
of Charles Hoyt)).
243. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) ("Man is, or should be, women's protector or defender.... The constitution of the
family organization, founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.");
DEMOS, supra note 188, at 50-51; see also COONTZ, supra note 193, at 138-39 (asserting that
the conception of the patriarchal breadwinner and maternal caregiver was not traditional but
rather arose with the rise of the child welfare movement); Grossberg, supra note 190, at 285-
87 (describing growing belief that women were more nurturing than men and so more suited
to providing for a child's welfare).
244. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 53 (1994) ("[T]he sex/gender/family system that prescribes earning
as the sole responsibility of husbands and unpaid domestic labor as the only proper long-term
occupation for women."); see also Joellen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of
Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right. 51 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103,216 n.32 (1994) (describing
the link between the politics of domesticity and female subordination). See generally
Gwendolyn Mink, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-
1942, at 151-73 (1995).
245. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 251 (noting mothers won custody of their children
in over ninety percent of all contested cases and they probably were also named custodial
parents as frequently through informal agreements); see also id. at 248-49 (noting how courts
adopted doctrines like the "tender years rule," which stated that because infants and small
children needed their mother's care, the mother should have custody). This reversed the
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intervention into women's homes and lives, especially those of single
mothers, for failing to meet certain prescribed standards of expected
behavior, including adherence to conventional sexual norms.246
From the child welfare worker's point of view, the image of a
drunken immigrant father as the central villain was replaced by
that of the incompetent, insensitive, and untrained mother who was
in need of professional guidance in order to feed, clothe, and clean
her children.24 Child welfare agents tended to believe the worst
about women, who were more likely to be labeled immoral than
men,m and more likely to be condemned when neglect was alleged
against both parents. 249 "Sexual immorality or intemperance" alone
provided grounds for child neglect charges in a mother, but not in a
father.2 11 "When a mother had adulterous relations with a boarder,
she was immoral; when a father did so with a housekeeper, she [the
housekeeper] was the menace to household morality."251 Agencies
justified the double standard by contending the mothers exert
greater moral influence over children than the father.252
Ironically, despite the development of the idea of separate
spheres and the family wage, women's participation in the labor
force rose sharply during this period. The number of women
entering the labor force doubled between 1880 and 1900; it in-
creased approximately another fifty percent between 1900 and
1919.253 The disconnect between the idealized view of a middle-class
woman able to devote herself fully to mothering, thanks to the
support of a husband, and the reality that more and more women,
especially single mothers, were entering the workforce - often
traditional pro-paternal bias in custody law. See Schiff, supra note 206, at 406 (describing the
traditional presumption in favor of granting a father custody of children following divorce or
separation unless he was grossly immoral, physically abusive to his wife or children, or
incapable of supporting himself and his children).
246. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 288; Schiff, supra note 206, at 412 (noting that
"mothers were held to a high standard of sexual morality and the lives of poor single mothers
were clearly exposed to social workers").
247. See GORDON, supra note 200, at 61, 73.
248. See id. at 92. In cases of equal severity, as defined by the MSPCC, children were
removed from seventy-five percent of single-mother homes compared with fifty-four percent
of two-parent homes. Id. at 94; see also Schiff, supra note 206, at 414 (noting investigations
by SPCCs were more likely to be based on charges of neglect by the mother than physical
abuse by the father). Only poverty was a better predictor of removal than single-motherhood,
though single mothers were generally poorer than other parent groups. See id.
249. See GORDON, supra note 200, at 93-94.
250. See id. at 93.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 93-94.
253. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 111 (1988).
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without any real choice 54 - made poor women particularly
vulnerable to outside intervention in their homes. Indeed, many of
the activities single mothers needed to do to support their children,
such as taking in (male) boarders, prostitution, bootlegging, or
simply leaving their children home alone to go to work, were
precisely those activities that aroused the suspicion of agents,
opened the door to investigations, and exposed them to a heightened
risk of child neglect charges.255
B. Child Welfare Reform in the Progressive Era: Continuity and
Change
The child welfare reform movement exhibited both considerable
continuity and change during the first decades of the twentieth
century, the period also known as the Progressive Era."' Acting
under the parens patriae doctrine,257 state legislatures promulgated
various child welfare reforms including aid to single mothers,
improvements in public health, and stronger child labor laws. 258 At
the same time, courts gradually replaced the traditional parental
bias of custody law with a standard based on the 'est interests of
the child" and increasingly saw parental authority as a power in
trust, subject to state regulation, rather than a natural or absolute
right.25 9 Intervention by agencies and courts in the homes of poor
.families nevertheless continued apace.
1. From Removal to Preservation
By the late nineteenth century, child welfare advocates
increasingly abandoned their beliefs in "child rescue" and the
superiority of foster care in favor of policies - such as assistance to
254. Cf. GORDON, supra note 200, at 83-84 (discussing how single mothers were placed in
a "double bind, as they struggled to meet the contradictory expectations of raising and
providing for children in a society organized on the premise of male breadwinning and female
domesticity").
255. See id. at 97-98.
256. See, e.g., HOFSTADTER, supra note 19, at 3.
257. See supra text accompanying note 203.
258. See WIEBE, supra note 19, at 119; see also Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
.Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471,474 (1987) ("Many Progressive programs shared a unifying child-centered
theme, and the changing cultural conception of childhood affected the Progressives' policies
embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor laws, child welfare laws, and compulsory
school attendance laws.") (citations omitted).
259. See GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 236-38.
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single mothers260 - that prevented removal and enabled children to
remain at home. 26 1 The SPCCs, once virtual "adjunct[s] to the police
force," increasingly provided preventative services.262 The influen-
tial White House Conference of 1909,2" whose famous first recom-
mendation charted a course away from institutionalization and
towards family preservation on the theory that homes should never
be broken up for poverty, but only for immorality and cruelty,
crystallized this shift." Courts echoed similar sentiments.2" This
change was due to: the growing influence of scientific charity, which
advocated "personal service, supervision, continuous oversight, and
care;"2  the increasing professionalization of the child welfare
field;267 and the continuing exaltation of a woman's role in the home
260. See Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 270-71
(2000) ("Around the turn of the century.... The Child Savers no longer supported removal of
children on grounds of poverty if the mother was otherwise fit and proper; instead, the
preferred solution was to provide support to such worthy mothers.") (citations omitted); see
also infra Part IV (describing the growth of mothers' pensions programs to assist single
mothers).
261. See Mark H. Leff, Consensus for Reform: The Mothers' Pension Movement in the
Progressive Era, 47 SoC. SERV. REV. 397, 410 (1973).
262. SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST?: CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 116 (1982); see also GORDON, supra note 200, at 69 (discussing the
increasing emphasis on the professional guidance of caseworkers and on the link between
poverty and the social environment).
263. See, e.g., RoY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935, at 97-98 (1968)
(noting that the Conference's recommendations embodied the most advanced child welfare
principles of the day).
264. Id. at 98.
Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization. It is the great molding
force of mind and of character. Children should not be deprived of it except for
urgent and compelling reasons. Children of parents of worthy character, suffer-
ing from temporary misfortune and children of reasonably efficient and deserv-
ing mothers who are without the support of the normal breadwinner, should, as
a rule, be kept with their parents, such aid being given as may be necessary to
maintain suitable homes for the rearing of the children.... Except in unusual
circumstances, the home should not be broken up for reasons of poverty, but only
for considerations of inefficiency or immorality.
Id.; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 185 ("Reformers at the turn of the century sought
to preserve the family as an economically private unit of breadwinning fathers and home-
centered mothers.... The state intervened not to undermine the family, but, rather, to foster
economic independence and its functional interdependence").
265. See, e.g., In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 487-93 (1899) (noting, inter alia, the advan-
tages of returning children to their parents from the charitable institutions to which they had
previously been committed if their parents could properly discharge their "moral and
financial" duties).
266. E.g., Mary Richmond, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MOTHERS' PENSIONS 58, 70 (Edna D.
Bullock ed., 1915).
267. See J. Robert Shull, Note, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: Notes on Dis-
course, History, and Change, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1665, 1688 (1999) (noting, inter alia, the in-
creasing emphasis on having professional expertise in the child welfare field between the
White House conferences of 1909 and 1919).
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and a mother's love as panaceas to the evils of orphanages.268
While the paradigm of the child welfare movement may have
shifted from removal to preservation, the emphasis on direct
intervention in the homes of poor families persisted.269 Agents
freely "enter[ed] into the privacy of every family, to carefully
investigate the manner in which the children [we]re provided for,
physically, morally, and intellectually, and in every case where the
requirements f[e]ll below a certain prescribed standard, to remove
the children and place them within the control of the state."27 ° The
principles of scientific charity emphasized the ability of experts to
conduct close and frequent supervision of families. As one social
worker said, casework meant "leaving no stone unturned to find the
trouble which drags a person down."271 Caseworkers might even
contact an applicant's relatives or neighbors to verify a household's
character. 2 Consequently, the number of children removed from
their homes and placed in institutions continued to rise until the
1930s.2 73
2. Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Courts
Growing concerns about juvenile delinquency led to an increase
in the government's parens patriae powers to intervene directly in
troubled families through newly created juvenile courts.274 In 1899,
268. See Left, supra note 261, at 410.
269. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 128-29 (noting the ideal of creating an idealized,
autonomous home in the long-run provided the basis for intervention in the short-run); see
also GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 298 ("[Tjhe state must be in its legislation and its political
operation a supplement to the integrity and moral righteousness of the home, or it will
inevitably disintegrate and become a destroyer of the home.") (quoting Lucinda Chandler,
vice-president of National Women's Suffrage Society).
270. GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 279-80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. FRANK J. BRUNO, TRENDS IN SOCIAL WORK AS REFLECTED IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORKER 1874-1946, at 184 (1948).
272. See, e.g., BEVERLY STADUM, POOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES: HARD WORKING CHARITY
CASES, 1900-1930, at 15 (1992); see also id. at 147 (describing how one caseworker enlisted a
neighborhood woman as a lookout to check for men's union suits on clotheslines of unmarried
or deserted women).
273. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 118-20; see also PLECK, supra note 86, at 131 (noting that
the number of children in institutions grew from 60,981 in 1890 to over 200,000 in 1923,
before declining by around thirty percent during the next decade).
274. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 134 ("Progressive era reformers still confounded crime
and poverty. For, by confounding dependency with delinquency, they erected a new
institution with unprecedented power to intrude into the lives of children and their families.");
see also Feld, supra note 258, at 474 ("The Progressives introduced a number of criminal
justice reforms at the turn of the century: probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the
juvenile court. All emphasized open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies to
rehabilitate the deviant.").
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Illinois established the first juvenile court in the United States.
By 1930, all states except two had created juvenile court systems.276
Juvenile courts were paternalistic in the way they stressed rehabili-
tation over punishment,277 and judges tended to perpetuate
patriarchal models of family governance and sought "to promote and
protect the republican family and its constellation of economic,
social, cultural, and class interests."278
Juvenile courts did not restrict parties by procedural rules, such
as the rules of evidence, and freely inquired into the life of a juvenile
and his or her family because the courts were designed to meet
children's needs and avoid the problems associated with criminal
courts.279 Juvenile courts gave probation officers extensive powers
to investigate allegedly unfit families. Probation officers visited
homes and spoke with family members as well as neighbors.28 °
They not only responded to complaints of child delinquency and
neglect, but also decided which cases to prosecute.281 Probation
officers investigated charges of delinquent behavior and made
recommendations to juvenile court judges. Furthermore, probation
officers supervised the activities of those sentenced to probation.282
Not surprisingly, many immigrant families complained that
probation officers were usurping their traditional parental preroga-
tives. 28a Although juvenile courts ultimately sought to avoid
breaking up families, they did so through extensive - and often
unwelcome - intervention in the home and increased governmental
275. See Act of April 21, 1899, § 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 137 (providing that "the care, custody
and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by
its parents"). The Act also reflected a preference for removing juveniles from their homes and
placing them in a better family. See Zierdt, supra note 219, at 406.
276. See Caroline T. Trost, Note, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA
Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 190 (1998).
277. See Zierdt, supra note 219, at 408 ("Why is it not just and proper to treat these
juvenile offenders, as we deal with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father
handles his own child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?") (quoting juvenile
court judge Julian Mack, of Cook County, Illinois). For example, the 1899 Illinois act
prohibited the placement of any child in a jail or police station. See id.
278. GROSSBERG, supra note 188, at 293; see also Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a
Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1038, 1067 (1979) (noting judges often spoke in terms of money and class when
defining a child's "best interests").
279. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 127.
280. See Schiff, supra note 206, at 414.
281. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 135; see also COONTZ, supra 193, at 139 (noting that court
officials were empowered to determine whether a youth was "predelinquent" and a family was
"decent").
282. See KATZ, supra note 201, at 135-36.
283. See PLECK, supra note 86, at 130-31.
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power over the family.' Thus, like SPCCs and other agencies in
the child protection movement, juvenile courts discarded the ideal
of the home as an impenetrable castle when they deemed poor, often
immigrant, families to be in need of state supervision and assis-
tance. The pervasive suspicion and monitoring that characterized
child welfare casework and the juvenile court system also accompa-
nied the administration of mothers' pensions programs.
III. MOTHERS' PENSIONS PROGRAMS AND THE ABANDONMENT OF
THE NOTION OF THE HOME AS A CASTLE
Beginning with Illinois in 1911, states enacted mothers'
pensions laws to provide financial assistance to single mothers. In
fact, targeting single mothers for assistance was not new; through-
out the nineteenth century, mother-only families were consistently
the largest group receiving public and private aid.285 With the
possible exception of workers' compensation, no other social welfare
initiative demonstrated a better legislative record during this period
than mothers' pensions programs. 286 By 1922, forty-two states had
adopted some form of mothers' pensions.287 By 1931, 90,000 families
received mothers' pensions, amounting to a total expenditure of
thirty-three million dollars.2
A. A New Approach to Social Welfare
A central goal of mothers' pensions was to enable families to
stay together by providing financial assistance. Supporters tended
to emphasize child welfare concerns and contended that aid to single
mothers would avoid the institutionalization of large numbers of
284. See COONTz, supra note 193, at 132 (describing the views of influential juvenile court
judge Ben Lindsay); see also Pleck, supra note 73, at 46 (noting that more families were placed
under supervision in cases involving alleged abuse and neglect of children - cases that also
fell under the authority ofjuvenile courts). Although juvenile courts were supposed to provide
an 'affectional mode of treatment," they often were the source of punitive authority. KATZ,
supra note 201, at 137 (citing a study of Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
285. See Joanne L. Goodwin, 'Employable Mothers' and 'Suitable Work. A Re-Evaluation
of Welfare and Wage-Earning for Women in the Twentieth-Century United States, 29 J. Soc.
HIsT. 253, 254 (1995). These programs had their roots in the overlapping areas of child
protection and social welfare reform. See generally GORDON, supra note 244.
286. See Leff, supra note 261, at 397.
287. See Ann Vandepol, Dependent Children, Child Custody, and the Mothers' Pensions:
The Transformation of State-Family Relations in the Early 20th Century, 29 SOC. PROBS. 227,
231 (1982).
288. See Leff, supra note 261, at 397.
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children.289 Although mothers' pensions were limited initially to
widows - indeed, some referred to them as "widows' pensions"29 ° -
many states gradually expanded them to cover divorced and
separated women.291 Nevertheless, eligibility restrictions remained
in place in various states.292
From the outset, overt efforts at social control beset mothers'
pensions programs. Moralistic considerations, such as whether the
recipient's children were legitimate, eclipsed a developing apprecia-
tion of how the social environment contributed to poverty.293
Advocates attempted to establish mothers' pensions as an entitle-
ment, distinguishing them from traditional public assistance in that
the pensions were a payment in return for a mother's service to
society.' 94 They deliberately invoked the image of Civil War
veterans, stressing the government should reward a mother's
service to the state with a pension, just like a soldier's service in
battle.295
Inadequate funding, stringent eligibility requirements, and
discretionary enforcement plagued mothers' pensions programs
throughout their existence.296 Whereas the state had traditionally
accomplished supervision of public assistance recipients in connec-
tion with "indoor relief" - providing assistance at institutions such
as the almshouse or workhouse - the state administered mothers',
289. See GORDON, supra note 244, at 38-40.
290. See TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 130 (1982); see also Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to
Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV.
415, 419 (1999) ("To deflect moral criticism, the campaign emphasized the provision of aid to
widows rather than deserted, divorced or unmarried mothers.").
291. See, e.g., BLANCHE D. COLL, PERSPECTIVES IN PUBLIC WELFARE: A HISTORY 80 (1979)
(stating that by 1926, only five states limited mothers' pensions to widows, while eight states
had more general eligibility provisions that referred to mothers with a dependent child or
children).
292. See TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 131 (pointing out that even by 1931 the only families
eligible in all states offering mothers' pensions were those in which the father was dead and
that widows constituted eighty-four percent of those receiving such pensions); Joanne L.
Goodwin, An American Experiment in Paid Motherhood: The Implementation of Mothers'
Pensions in Early Twentieth-Century Chicago, 4 GENDER & HIST. 323, 333 (1992) (noting that
Illinois continued to exclude deserted women from mothers' pensions until 1923).
293. See MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE,
1890-1930, at 145 (1994).
294. See William Hard, Pensions for Mothers: General Discussion, 3 AM. LAB. LEG. REV.
231-33 (1913) ("[A] mother should not be supported because she is dependent ... [but] is paid
because [she is] an employee...."), quoted in Ann Shola Orloff, Gender in Early U.S. Social
Policy, 3 J. POLY HIST. 249, 257 (1991); see also Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, Neglected
Widowhood in the Juvenile Court, AM. J. SOC. 67 (1910) (arguing mothers' pensions should be
'available, sufficient in amount, regular in payment, dignifying in its assurance of the
community's concern for the well-being of her group").
295. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 144.
296. See GORDON, supra note 244, at 63.
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pensions through "outdoor relief' - providing assistance at the
home 297 - thanks to principles of scientific charity and social
casework. States not only went to great lengths to ensure all single
mothers met financial and moral eligibility requirements, but they
also subjected them to continual and often intense scrutiny.
The central figure in the administration of mothers' pensions
was the "friendly visitor," the caseworker who was supposed to
uplift the poor through investigation and control.298 Caseworkers
were urged to collect and interpret "any and all facts as to personal
or family history, which, taken together, indicate the nature of a
given client's difficulty and the means for [its] solution."299 These
friendly visitors were, however, "anything but unmeddlesome good
friends.""°0 While initially designed to allow a social worker to get
to know and assist a family on an individual basis, social casework
often degenerated into "snooping."301 For example, the case records
of the New York Charity Organization Society (NYCOS) °2 suggest
how "friendly visitors" scrutinized recipients for deceit, 30 3 "extrava-
gant" expenditures,3° claims of entitlement,35 and association with
"male company." 36 Eventually, the rhetoric about mothers' pen-
sions as a right "virtually disappeared - except among poor
mothers themselves."3 7 Meanwhile, the numbers of poor children
297. HELEN ZNANIECKA LOPATA & HENRY P. BREHM: WIDOWS AND DEPENDENT WIVES: FROM
SOCIAL PROBLEM TO FEDERAL PROGRAM 13 (1986).
298. See Muriel W. Pumphrey & Ralph E. Pumphrey, The Widows' Pension Movement,
1900-1930: Preventative Child-Saving or Social Control?, in SOCIAL WELFARE OR SOCIAL
CONTROL: SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS ON REGULATING THE POOR 51, 58 (Walter I.
Trattner ed., 1983).
299. JOHN H. EHRENREICH: THE ALTRUISTIC IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WORK AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 64 (1985) (quoting influential casework theorist Mary
Richards).
300. Leff, supra note 261, at 412.
301. BRUNO, supra note 271, at 184-85; WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE
STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 204 (1984) (describing casework as a
"device for snooping" or a means to "control the needy").
302. The NYCOS case records are on file at Butler Library, Columbia University, New
York.
303. See NYCOS Case No. 167944 (1912) (calling woman a "schemer"); NYCOS Case No.
2910 (1910) (charging a woman with under-reporting the amount of insurance available on
her husband's death).
304. See NYCOS Case No. 148059 (1913) (noting a woman's good furniture and demanding
that she "readjust her manner of living").
305. See NYCOS Case No. 140210 (1913) (stating that the "woman seemed to feel she had
a right to demand assistance").
306. See NYCOS Case No. 147671 (1913) (stating that the woman had encouraged male
company and was intemperate).
307. GORDON, supra note 244, at 63.
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in institutions - which the state intended to reduce through
mothers' pensions awards - continued to rise.3"'
B. Predicates for Intervention into the Home
Despite supporters' descriptions of "the inviolability of the
relation of mother and child,"30 9 mothers' pensions programs reified
only certain homes and the inviolability of certain mother-child
relationships. Determining precisely which homes and which
mother-child relationships merited state assistance led to the great
paradox of mothers' pensions: to preserve the home and the mother-
child relationship, states intervened directly in the home, without
any real concern for the privacy of recipients and their families.
1. Dependency, Inadequate Funding, and Lack of Entitlement
The state inadequately funded mothers' pensions programs
throughout their existence.310 Inadequate funding led to intense
scrutiny to determine whether a mother met strict financial
eligibility requirements,31' contributed to the substitution of
behavioral supervision for economic criteria,312 interjected social
caseworkers into the lives of recipients, 13 and increased casework-
ers' discretion to decide which mothers should receive assistance.314
This helped undermine the notion that any single mother had a
308. After the passage of mothers' pension laws, the number of institutions and children
in institutions increased from 1,151 and 120,000, respectively, in 1910, to 1,558 and 142,971,
respectively, in 1923. See Eve P. Smith, Characteristics of Social Welfare Stasis and Change:
A Comparison of the Characteristics of Two Child Welfare Agencies in the 1920s, 20 J. SOC. &
SOC. WELFARE 105, 106 (1993); see also supra note 273 and accompanying text.
309. MARY F. BOGUE, ADMINISTRATION OF MOTHER'S AID IN TEN LOCALITIES, CHILDREN'S
BUREAU REPORT No. 184, at 5 (1928) (quoting a 1912 Children's Bureau study).
310. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BREMNER, FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 223 (1956) (observing that the rapidity with which mothers' pensions
legislation was passed may be explained in part by the fact that "the program hurt no
interests and cost very little"); Stanley H. Howe, Adequate Relief to Needy Mothers in
Pennsylvania, NAT'L CONF. CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS 447 (1914), reprinted in SELECTED
ARTICLES ON MOTHERS' PENSIONS 14 (Edna D. Bullock ed., 1915) (describing funding as
"ludicrously inadequate").
311. See EDITH ABBOTT & SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AID-
TO-MOTHERS LAW IN ILLINOIS, CHILDREN'S BUREAU REPORT NO. 82, at 27 (1921) (noting that
in Cook County, Illinois, a recipient's spending was closely monitored and that she was
required to keep "full and accurate accounts"); TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 131; Vandepol, supra
note 287, at 231 (arguing that officials sought to compel adherence to economic eligibility
criteria and to prevent "reckless expenditures" by examining recipients' expense records).
312. See LUBOVE, supra note 263, at 108; TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 133.
313. See Left, supra note 261, at 412.
314. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 149.
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claim to privacy once she applied for or received a pension; it
suggested instead the mother-applicant herself was in some sense
public property. According to one state legislative committee:
Apublic charge is public property ... the public is entitled to the
most intimate acquaintance to every item of expenditure in the
administration of the law. Taxpayers have no respect for family
privacy or prejudices when they are being paid for out their
taxes and no power of sentiment will alter that attitude.315
To qualify for a mothers' pension award, applicants had to
undergo time-consuming316 and often humiliating investigations. 317
After obtaining an award, administering officials, who considered
regular home visits indispensable 1 and who rarely demonstrated
any concern for the privacy of recipients, subjected recipients to
frequent and extensive supervision. The qualification standards
required mothers to maintain detailed records of family expenses,
which caseworkers reviewed monthly to "prevent reckless expendi-
tures."319 Caseworkers often noted whether mothers were "economi-
cal" in their purchase of groceries or use of coal. 2° One case record
describes a woman forced to show a caseworker a "shirt full of holes"
to prove she needed assistance; the caseworker, after noting the
"good furniture" in the mother's house, told her that she "ought not
need charity" and instructed her to "readjust [her family's] manner
of living."32'
315. REPORT OF LEG. COMM., OR. FED. OF WOMEN'S CLUBS, 1914-15 (emphasis added); see
also GORDON, supra note 244, at 56-57 (describing the opposition to making mothers' pensions
an entitlement).
316. See, e.g., LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 151 (observing that in Cook County,
Illinois, initial verification of need took from two to four months).
317. See COLL, supra note 291, at 79; see also BOGUE, supra note 309, at 6 (noting a social-
history sheet generally required facts about residence, property, the father's death,
commitment, divorce, dates of children's birth, marriage, and often citizenship). One study
reports half of the mothers' pensions agencies studied required that the children and mothers
be given a physical examination and that the investigating official have access to the school's
medical inspection record). See id. at 11, 13. This often caused great hardship to women and
their children without revealing any new information. See ABBOTT & BRECKINRIDGE, supra
note 311, at 23-24.
318. See ABBOTT & BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 311, at 27; see also LADD-TAYLOR, supra note
293, at 151 (noting that over eighty-five percent of families who received aid for longer than
two years were visited more than once a month).
319. Vandepol, supra note 287, at 231.
320. LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 153 (noting one caseworker's description of a
recipient's attitude as "quite hopeless").
321. NYCOS Case No. 172737.
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2. Suitable Home Requirements
So-called "suitable home" requirements represented an even
more dramatic incursion into recipients' homes and lives. 322 Most
mothers' pensions laws contained suitable home requirements,
which meant assistance had to be denied or terminated if an agent
believed a mother failed to measure up to standards.32 3 Although
premised on the purportedly objective principles of scientific
charity321 originally associated with private charities,3 25 suitable
home requirements were in fact highly subjective and gave case-
workers wide latitude in administering grants.3 26  Moreover,
suitable home requirements made possible tight limits on funding
and enabled administrators and caseworkers to maintain traditional
distinctions between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor.327
Suitable home requirements were purportedly adopted to
determine whether a mother was a "fit and capable person to bring
up her children, and whether the inmates and surroundings of her
household [were] such as to render it suitable for her children to
reside at home."328 In fact, suitable home requirements offered a
means of controlling the behavior of mothers.
The public can make adequate relief a powerful lever to lift and
keep mothers to a high standard of home care.... If we grant the
aid to any woman whose care of her children will just pass
muster, we throw away a chance to make these women improve.
If, on the contrary, we make relief under this law conditional on
322. See GORDON, supra note 244, at 45 (arguing suitable home provisions "gave relatively
unfettered discretion to social work administrators and judges as to what constituted proper
family life").
323. See id. at 43, 46-48.
324. Supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text; see Pensions for the Widows of New York,
34 SURvEY 1 (1915), in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MOTHER'S PENSIONS 57-58 (Edna D. Bullock
ed., 1915) (noting the close connection between public welfare authorities and private
charities in the administration of mothers' pensions).
325. See, e.g., COLL, supra note 291, at 78 (discussing the spread of private charity agencies'
conceptions of social work to public welfare agencies); LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 147
(arguing the passage of the New York mothers' pensions law reflected the triumph of the
individual casework perspective).
326. See Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief But Upon the Terms of Coming into the House" -
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System,
104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2184 (1995) ("[1In the early 1900's, practitioners of 'scientific charity'
made an ongoing relationship between agent and applicant necessary to a determination of
need. This intense personalization of relief required the repeated physical presence of the
agent, the 'friendly visitor' in the recipients' homes, and in their lives.").
327. See COLL, supra note 291, at 44.
328. Pumphrey & Pumphrey, supra note 298, at 58 (describing Maine's "suitable home"
requirement).
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a fairly high standard of home care, we shall find that the
mothers will rise to this standard.32 s
Such catchall moral requirements sought to influence a wide range
of behavior, including personal hygiene,"' avoidance of tobacco
smoking,33' and religious instruction for children.332 In large cities,
where immigrants constituted the majority of mothers' pensions
recipients,333 the government used suitable home requirements to
force immigrants to conform to so-called "American" standards.334
The government used the same standards to exclude applicants
based on race.336
By far the most intrusive requirements concerned sexual
norms.33 Not only did numerous states deem non-widows ineligible
for assistance, 3 7 particularly those with illegitimate children,338 but
they also subjected recipients' personal lives to continual surveil-
lance. Much was made of male lodgers, whose "presence ... in the
same home with a full pay envelope may offer an overwhelming
temptation,"339 and who were "likely to be an influence making
towards an unfit home."' ° For example, in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts the presence of male lodgers in the home made
mothers ineligible to receive assistance.r" Additionally, casework-
ers who perceived sexual transgressions as the result of bad
329. A.E. Sheffield, Administration of the Mothers'Aid Law in Massachusetts, 31 SURVEY
644 (1914), in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MOTHER'S PENSIONS 73 (Edna D. Bullock ed., 1915)
(quoting a founder of the Massachusetts mothers' pension law) (emphasis added).
330. See, e.g., LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 153 (noting a social worker's description
of a recipient's home initially as "very nice and clean" but later as "very dirty").
331. See Left, supra note 261, at 412.
332. See TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 132.
333. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 244, at 47.
334. See id. at 45; see also Brito, supra note 290, at 420 ("Progressive reformers intended
for white, immigrant women to benefit from these new programs in order to alleviate poverty
and socialize them to the American way of life.").
335. See Brito, supra note 290, at 421 ("Mothers' aid programs almost entirely excluded
black women, some of whom were overwhelmingly poor.").
336. See, e.g., STADUM,supra note 272, at 113 (noting inappropriate sexuality was the most
common charge made against women according to Minnesota case records).
337. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
338. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 293, at 149.
339. TIFFIN, supra note 262, at 132.
340. Sheffield, supra note 329, at 75; see also ABBOTT & BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 311, at
39-40 (noting in thirty-eight percent of the cases in Cook County, Illinois, where mothers'
pensions were terminated, the reason was not a change in income or marital status, but
rather a charge that the mother was "untruthful," "keeping boarders," or "refusing to
cooperate").
341. See STADUM, supra note 272, at 54. There were also objections on medical or scientific
grounds to the practice of keeping boarders, which was associated with the spread of disease,
especially among immigrant families in tenements. See id.
"A MAN'S HOME IS HIS CASTLE"
housekeeping encouraged women to maintain their husbands "in
reasonable fidelity" by improving their home economics and house-
hold management skills.342 Juvenile courts administered many
mothers' pensions programs, 43 thus making mothers open to the
same extensive and paternalistic social controls as juvenile delin-
quents.
Evidence suggests there was considerable resistance to suitable
home requirements. For example, a study of mothers' pensions in
Cook County, Illinois, describes the receipt of aid as a "demoralizing
process," observing that:
Many of the women feel that it is a great hardship to be obliged
to tell a public officer how they have spent their money, and they
complain that asking for such accounting is a needless prying
into their affairs. It is not easy for anyone who has spent money
foolishly to tell about it, and it must be very hard to give an
account of unwise expenditures to be presented to an official
committee.345
Other studies suggest women frequently resisted pressures to
assimilate,346 lectures about maternal responsibilities,3 7 allegations
of alcohol use and theft,34 and the imposition of sexual norms
prohibited even going out at night with men.349 In general, women
resisted when they felt a caseworker assumed the right to know too
much about them, asserted agency direction over family affairs, or
sought additional information about them from relatives or
neighbors, without any respect for their privacy.35°
Mothers' pensions programs thus show how the notion of
separate spheres and economic dependency undermined privacy in
the home. Administrators divided non-wage-earning women into
good and bad classes of dependency: "a 'good,' household dependency
predicated of children and wives, and an increasingly 'bad' (or at
least dubious) charity dependency, predicated recipients of relief."35'
342. Id. at 113.
343. See supra Part II.B.2.
344. See GORDON, supra note 244, at 45.
345. ABBOTr & BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 311, at 20.
346. See SOPHONISBA BRECKINRIDGE, FAMILY WELFARE WORK IN A METROPOLITAN
COMMUNITY: SELECTED CASE RECORDS 490 (1924).
347. See id. at 633. (discussing resistance to lectures about not spoiling children).
348. See, e.g., STADUM, supra note 272, at 10 (discussing a study of social worker case
records from Minneapolis, Minnesota).
349. See id. at 6-7.
350. See id. at 135-38.
351. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the
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Women receiving mothers' pensions were burdened with the stigma
of dependency and were forced to endure, and indeed complained
about, infantilizing supervision, a loss of privacy, and a maze of
bureaucratic rules that limited their decision making power over
such basic matters as housing, employment, and sexual relations. 52
C. Influence of Mothers' Pensions on the Administration of
Federal Welfare
The design and implementation of mothers' pension programs
had a significant influence on subsequent federal welfare
programs.5 3 Like mothers' pensions, the federal welfare programs
that followed - Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and its successor,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) - relied on the
idea of the "friendly visitor" and often involved overt attempts at
social control. 354 Although not specifically required by either federal
regulations or legislation, home visits, suitable home requirements,
and the application of scientific analysis to a recipient's private
home life played an important role in federal welfare administra-
tion.3 5 Individual states had the latitude to set the conditions for
relief 3 6 Many imposed "man in the house" rules during the 1940s
and 1950s that allowed social workers to make unannounced visits
to homes, and then eliminate from the welfare rolls any woman
U.S. Welfare State, 19 J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 309,320 (1994). The term "dependency"
itself had taken on a new, highly gendered, and negative meaning following the rise of
industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century in response to the growing division between
the wage-earning, independent, dominant male and the non-employed, dependent,
subordinate female. See id. at 315, 318-19.
352. Cf. id. at 330 (describing the belief that the line between deserving and undeserving
dependents needed to be maintained by careful vigilance).
353. See generally GORDON, supra note 244, at 1-13 (discussing the development of federal
assistance programs). Mothers' pension statutes, still on the books in some states, have also
provided the basis, more recently, for expanded state welfare benefits won through litigation.
See Nancy Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 565, 570 (1989) (discussing New York and Massachusetts statutes).
354. See id. at 275-76 (noting that the model state law distributed by the Social Security
Board for ADC described as eligible "'any dependent child who is living in a suitable family
home"); see also Betsy Ledbetter Hancock & Leroy H. Pelton, Home Visits: History and
Function, 70 J. CONTEMP. Soc. WORK 21 (1989) (noting that the reliance on home visits under
mothers' pensions became "a firmly established practice" in the administration ofADC). ADC
provided payments to needy children but not their caretakers; the program was changed in
1962 to provide aid to needy families, and was renamed AFDC. See also Brito, supra note
290, at 422 n.41.
355. See, e.g., Brito, supra note 290; Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation, and the Welfare
Home Visit, 79 YALE L.J. 746, 747 (1970).
356. Bennett, supra note 326, at 2185.
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found living with a man.357 These rules infringed on individual
privacy, as "[v]ague definitions of 'substitute fathers' encouraged
caseworkers to conduct invasive interviews in which they probed
widely for the most intimate details of the mothers' personal lives,'
making the welfare process "a humiliating and dehumanizing
ordeal."35 For example, one state's welfare administration deter-
mined how much "proof of weekly sex was sufficient indication of
the presence of a substitute father relationship," and denied or
terminated benefits on that basis.359 Suitable home requirements
also sanctioned discriminatory policies by enabling caseworkers and
officials to exclude applicants based on race.3 °
Eventually, the intrusive, discretionary nature of home visits
aroused opposition and generated constitutional concerns. 36' It was
not until the advent of the welfare rights movement of the 1960s,362
however, that traditional beliefs about the privacy of the home were
first applied in the public assistance context. During the 1960s and
1970s, a legal-bureaucratic model emphasizing fixed, formal rules
of eligibility and legal entitlement to benefits replaced the more
discretionary, professional social casework model that originated
with mothers' pensions programs. 36 Central to the creation of legal
357. See, e.g., Brito, supra note 290, at 422-23.
358. Bennett, supra note 326, at 2186. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 166 (1971).
A central feature of the recipient's degradation is that she must surrender
commonly accepted rights in exchange for aid. AFDC mothers, for example, are
often forced to answer questions about their sexual behavior ("When did you last
menstruate?"), open their closets to inspection ("Whose pants are those?"), and
permit their children to be interrogated ("Do any men visit your mother?").
Announced raids, usually after midnight and without benefit of warrant, in
which a recipient's home is searched for signs of'immoral' activities, have also
been part of life on AFDC.
Id.
359. See Bennett, supra note 326, at 2186 n.116.
360. See WINFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 32-39 (1965); GORDON, supra note
244, at 298-99.
361. See, e.g., Note, supra note 355, at 760-61 (advocating that home visits be limited to the
provision of services, such as public health information, and prohibiting any investigation of
the recipient in her home); see also Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the
Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347,1355 (1963) (arguing midnight welfare searches violate
the Constitution); Joel F. Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other
Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12 (1969) (noting the potential sense of
stigma attached to home visits); Note, Warrantless Welfare Searches Violate Recipient's
Constitutional Rights, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 95, 97-98 (1967) (arguing also that midnight
welfare searches violate the Constitution).
362. See generally Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty
Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1016-19 (1999).
363. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1126, 1137-38 (2000).
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protections for welfare recipients was the changing understanding
of welfare as a form of property articulated in Charles Reich's
famous law review article.3" In King v. Smith, 65 the Supreme
Court invalidated a state's "substitute father" regulation that
precluded welfare benefits where a man was found to have had
sexual relations with the child's mother, determining that the
purported state interest of discouraging immorality and illegitimacy
was no longer valid under federal welfare laws. 6  The Court
acknowledged the history of using suitable home provisions to
disqualify children on the basis of the alleged immoral behavior of
their mothers,6 7 but concluded that "federal public welfare policy
now rests on a basis considerably more sophisticated and enlight-
ened than the 'worthy-person' concept of earlier times."368 Numer-
ous other decisions contributed to the development of welfare rights
during this period. 69
Courts also sought to extend the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment to protect welfare recipients against warrantless home
searches, particularly against those searches intended to enforce
"man in the house" rules. While the Supreme Court held in
Camara v. Municipal Court3 71 the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement extended to non-criminal, administrative inspections
such as municipal housing code inspections,372 it soon limited
364.' See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the Modern /Postmodern Search
for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1019 (1988) (discussing the influence of
Charles Reich's The New Property).
365. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
366. See id. at 320.
367. See id. at 321.
368. Id. at 324-25.
369. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding a welfare recipient is
entitled to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(finding unconstitutional a one-year residency requirement for the receipt of welfare benefits).
See generally Brito, supra note 290, at 424 ("Welfare became a statutory 'right' and a uniform
means test was implemented for determining eligibility"); Bennett, supra note 326, at 2184:
[An astonishing burst of regulatory liberalization ... empower[ed] the recipient
to set the terms: of how, when, and where she would apply for assistance; of
what she would reveal of the physical and emotional interior of her life; and of
how she would demand an accounting and justification from the state of any
adverse action.
370. See Parrish v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 267 (Cal. 1967) (holding that mass
early morning raids had to comply with the same standards governing searches for criminal
evidence). The court reasoned that a welfare agent's "unlimited power" over the livelihood of
recipients nullified any apparent consent to such raids. Id. at 229-31. Parrish essentially
made such searches unconstitutional in California. See Note, supra note 361, at 97-98.
371. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
372. See id. at 534. "Even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in
limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official
authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious
"A MAN'S HOME IS HIS CASTLE"
Camara's potential application in the welfare context. In Wyman v.
James,'73 the Court rejected the extension of the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirement to welfare searches, holding a home
visit by a caseworker was not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." 4 The Court relied on the traditional distinc-
tion between criminal and non-criminal searches," 5 contrasting the
housing search in Camara as criminal in nature.3 6 It also empha-
sized a number of other factors, many of which had previously
justified the invasive practices used in administering mothers'
pensions: the need to protect the welfare of the child;377 the public's
interest in sound financial management of resources; 78 the
rehabilitative purpose of home visits; 379 the well-established practice
of home visits;8 ° and the analogy of welfare searches to the work of
the "friendly visitor" rather than the detective.38 '
The seemingly inconsistent treatment of the home in the public
welfare context was attacked by Justice Douglas, who, dissenting in
Wyman, observed "[i]t is a strange jurisprudence indeed which
safeguards the businessman at his place of work from warrantless
searches but will not do the same for a mother in her home."382 In
an era of expanding government regulation, Justice Marshall
believed restricting "the Fourth Amendment to 'the traditional
criminal law context' trample[d] the ancient concept that a man's
home is his castle."383
The 1996 federal welfare reform act,3 4 which replaced an
individual entitlement to welfare benefits with block grants to
threat to personal and family security." Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
373. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
374. See id. at 326. The Court refused to reach the issue of early morning mass raids at
issue in Parrish.
375. See id. at 324-25.
376. See id. at 325.
377. See id. at 319.
378. See id. at 318-19.
379. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319-20 (1971).
380. See id. at 320 n.7.
381. See id. at 322-23.
382. Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, compared to home visits by welfare
agents, the state's interests in administrative searches, such as housing inspections, seem
greater, and the invasion of privacy less significant. See Note, supra note 355, at 757
(comparing the frequency and broad scope of home visits by welfare agents with the
infrequent and narrowly defined visits by housing inspectors; contending that the state's
interest in safeguarding public health and safety through housing inspections trumps that of
"keeping down the welfare roles") (citation omitted). For a discussion of housing inspections,
see infra Part IV.
383. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
384. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193,110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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states,38 5 revived many of the tactics of mothers' pensions, including
using financial assistance as a means of social control and limiting
a recipient's privacy and autonomy.38 Indeed, the new welfare law
reflects a striking attempt to control and modify the behavior of
single women by imposing strict work requirements,3 87 implicitly
encouraging states to implement "family caps" that require the
denial of an incremental increase in benefits following the birth of
an additional child,"8 and placing restrictions on teenage mothers
seeking public assistance.8 9 The increased scrutiny of recipients to
enforce measures like work requirements has led to a rebirth of
unannounced home visits in come states.3 °
The history of mothers' pensions suggests how economic
dependency and Victorian era gender-based stereotypes helped
sanction and promote a view of the home not as a castle but rather
as a laboratory for social control. It should also serve as caution to
those who have advocated a return to a social work model character-
ized by discretionary decision-making rather than adherence to
strict formal rules of eligibility and administration.39 '
IV. TENEMENT HOUSING REFORM, CLASS, AND PRIVACY
Tenement housing reform provides another window into social
class and privacy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
385. See 42 U.S.C. § 603.
386. See, e.g., Brito, supra note 260, at 234 ("The Personal Responsibility Act permits and
encourages states to implement a number of measures that are designed to pressure women
on welfare into conforming to these prescribed marital, childbearing, and parenting norms.");
James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling
Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 107-21 (1996) (criticizing the theories behind the
recent welfare reforms and the return of a paternalistic response to poverty).
387. See 42 U.S.C. § 607.
388. See Wendy Chavkin et al., Sex Reproduction, and Welfare Reform, 7 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POLy 379, 381-82 (2000) (discussing increase in family caps since the passage
of the PRWORA); see also Erin Meehan Richmond, Note, The Interface of Poverty and Violence
Against Women: How Federal and State Welfare Reforms Can Best Respond, 35 NEW. ENG. L.
REV. 569, 581 n.77 (2001).
389. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(4) (2001) (requiring any unmarried individual under eighteen
years of age and caring for a child of more than twelve weeks of age must be working towards
a high school diploma or participating in an alternative education or training program to
qualify for assistance).
390. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Challenges Invasive Home Searches
of Welfare Recipients in San Diego Area, July 24,2000, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/
2000/n072400b.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) (describing legal challenge to eligibility
verification procedures in San Diego). Moreover, the use of welfare to promote marriage has
emerged as a central issue in the debate over the reauthorization of the 1996 act. See Robin
Toner, Welfare Chief is Hoping to Promote Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at Al.
391. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System,
92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
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centuries. This Part describes the origins of tenement housing
reform and explores the factors that shaped its design and imple-
mentation, focusing on New York City, the leader in the tenement
housing reform movement. It then compares the home's treatment
in tenement housing reform to its treatment in other reforms during
this period.
A. Development of Tenement Housing Reform
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, numerous cities and
towns adopted stricter housing codes for tenements.392 Tenements
were the buildings in working-class districts that landlords
subdivided and partitioned so that whole families could crowd into
single rooms.393 By 1900, there were 82,000 dwellings in tenements
in New York City, and the social conditions there were "too misera-
ble to describe."394
In contrast to previous legislation designed to protect cities
from fire and disease, these later codes were in good part to protect
tenants.395 Like other regulatory efforts of the Progressive Era,
tenement housing reform sought to control the use of property for
the general social and economic well being" and to remedy a
century of "lax enforcement of the law and unrestrained and
unimaginative building."397 Tenement housing reform also sought
to take advantage of advancements in scientific knowledge,
particularly the recent discovery of the bacterial origins of disease,
to prevent outbreaks of typhoid, malaria, cholera, diphtheria, and,
392. See BREMNER, supra note 310, at 209.
393. See GARRATY, supra note 189, at 187-88 (describing conditions where, inter alia,
interior rooms might lack ventilation and entire buildings might lack toilets); see also
Tenement House Act of 1901, ch. 334, § 2(1) (defining tenement as "any house or building, or
portion thereof, which is rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied, or is occupied, as the
home or residence of three families or more living independently of each other, doing their
cooking upon the premises").
394. JOSEPH D. McGOLDRICK ET AL., BUILDING REGULATION IN NEW YORK CITY: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 81 (1944); see also CASHMAN, supra note 20, at 123
(noting immigrant communities living in tenements were "prone to outbreaks of cholera,
typhus, and typhoid").
395. See Judah Gribetz & Frank P. Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1259-60 (1966).
396. See id.; see also Scott M. Reznick, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in
Nineteenth Century America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 854 (1973) ("When ... the problems of
urbanization became increasingly severe, the governmental power necessary to meet them
was produced by broadening the traditional concept of common law nuisances into a general
legislative authority, predicated on the police power, to regulate property in order to protect
public health and safety.").
397. MCGOLDRICK ET AL., supra note 394, at 81.
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above all, tuberculosis,39 the leading cause of death in the United
States in 1916. 399 Armed with such scientific discoveries, housing
reformers focused on the connection between disease and the often-
deplorable conditions in tenements, such as overcrowding, primitive
waste disposal facilities, and inadequate lighting and ventilation.400
New York emerged as the leader in promulgating tenement
reform legislation, and other states and cities soon emulated its
landmark Tenement House Act of 1901.401 The Act imposed mini-
mum standards on all tenement houses erected after its passage,
while also requiring numerous improvements in existing tenements,
such as cutting new windows into interior rooms, adding fire-pre-
vention measures, curtailing occupancy of basements and cellars,
installing toilets, and maintaining the cleanliness of buildings and
apartments.40 2 The Tenement House Act-also provided for sub-
stantial enforcement measures, breaking with the past pattern of
weak enforcement. 403  The Act required monthly inspections for
tenements whose average rents totaled twenty-five dollars or less. 4
4
It created the Tenement House Department, a citywide department
dedicated to enforcement, and provided for stricter sanctions by
authorizing the imposition of fines and imprisonment after a
hearing by a magistrate.05 It also attempted to eliminate loopholes
398. See ROY LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN
NEWYORK CITY, 1890-1917, at 88 (1963); Reznick, supra note 396, at 859 ("Mortality statistics
indicated that death rates [from disease] rose in proportion to the degree of urban
congestion.").
399. LILIAN BRANDT, FACTS ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS 7 (1916). Tuberculosis was responsible
for nearly fourteen percent of all deaths in New York City in 1913. See id. at 8. Attempts to
eradicate tuberculosis eventually proved effective; by 1965 it had been reduced to twentieth
on the list of causes of death. See ANTHONY M. LOWELL, TUBERCULOSIS: TUBERCULOSIS
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY AND ITS CONTROL 71 (1969).
400. See 1 THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM 447 (Robert W. De Forest & Lawrence Veiller
eds., 1970); see also CASHMAN, supra note 20, at 123 (discussing steps to address the pressing
problem of human sewage and industrial waste); LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 84.
401. See BREMNER, supra note 310, at 209 (noting in the next fifteen years, eleven states
and more than forty cities enacted new tenement housing codes or revised existing building
and sanitary regulations modeled on New York's 1901 law); see also EDNA TRULL, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF REGULATORY INSPECTIONAL SERVICES IN AMERICAN CITIES 92 (1932)
(discussing the expansion of building codes until 1931); Comment, State Health Inspections
and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L. REV. 513,530
n.61 (1960) (noting by 1953 every state empowered local health officers or boards of health to
make sanitary investigations and inspections).
402. See TRULL, supra note 401, at 82.
403. See Judith A. Gilbert, Tenements and Takings: Tenement House Department of New
York v. Moeschen as a Counterpoint to Lochner v. New York, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437, 448
n.77 (1991).
404. See LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 160.
405. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 447.
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such as zoning variances.40 If a tenement contained numerous or
severe violations of the law, the Tenement House Commissioner
could declare it unsafe for occupancy and order that it be vacated.4 °7
The Tenement House Act intended to give "enforcing officials in
their fight against unsanitary conditions every weapon known to
modern or ancient warfare."408 To ensure compliance, inspectors
possessed a right of access at "all reasonable times" and to all parts
of the tenement, "free of hindrance. " "4 ° Numerous other cites
emulated the Tenement House Act's enforcement provisions.410
Tenement housing reform illustrates how many viewed
administrative solutions to housing and public health problems in
terms of broad executive mandates. The mayor held full general
authority and his subordinates exercised virtual autonomy in their
respective areas of expertise.41' Such broad investigative mandates
fit squarely within the muckraking tradition of the Progressive
Era.412 Indeed, it was Jacob Riis's 1877 expos6 of slum conditions in
the New York Tribune that helped spark the appointment of the
city's Tenement Housing Commission.413 As one reformer said,
"Light is a very effective moral disinfectant."
414
The Tenement House Act marked a significant intrusion into
the rights of property owners. 415  Like previous housing code
legislation,41 6 however, the Tenement House Act and its successor,
the Multiple-Dwelling Law, withstood constitutional challenges in
406. See TRULL, supra note 401, at 82.
407. See id.; see also CITY OF NEW YORK, CODE OF ORDINANCES art. 10, § 185 (1915)
(describing the power of the Board of Health to abate nuisances).
408. LAWRENCE VEILLER, A MODEL HOUSING LAW 230 (1914).
409. Id. at 240.
410. See, e.g., TRULL, supra note 401, at 93-94 (noting the extensive power of housing
inspectors in numerous cities); SCHYLUR C. WALLACE, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
OVER CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1928) (discussing the broad scope of housing
inspection in other cities); see also VEILLER, supra note 408, at 227-28 (proposing that other
cities adopt sanctions for both owners and tenants who violated the local housing law).
411. See WIEBE, supra note 19, at 169-70.
412. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 19, at 185 ("The fundamental critical
achievement of American Progressivism was the business of exposure...."); cf. ROSEN, supra
note 192, at 14-15 (describing muckraking exposes to uncover the "evils" of prostitution).
413. CASHMAN, supra note 20, at 129. Riis's expos6 How the Other Half Lives, his first in
a series about the tenements, offered suggestions to alleviate the poverty and degradation of
the tenements and utilized the new medium of photography for documentation. See id. at
129-30.
414. BREMNER, supra note 310, at 205 (quoting reformer Charles R. Henderson of the
University of Chicago).
415. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 440.
416. See Comment, supra note 401, at 528 n.57 (observing that courts consistently upheld
the broad delegation of regulatory powers in response to new developments in medical
knowledge or techniques).
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the courts.417 In general, courts accepted that housing conditions,
when related to the health and general welfare of the community,
were a public nuisance and thus subject to state regulation,
including actual physical destruction.418 Notably, many violations
under the Tenement House Act were not tantamount to the
common-law definition of nuisance.41 s Acceptance of increasingly
broad tenement housing reforms thus signaled greater tolerance of
legislative and administrative classification of nuisances,42 ° and a
belief that private property was not completely sacrosanct.421 In
short, tenement housing reformers did not consider those targeted
homes impregnable castles, but rather open to regulatory interven-
tion for the greater social good.
B. Social Factors Shaping Intervention and Enforcement
While tenement housing reformers sought to improve living
conditions, moralistic judgments about the inhabitants of the
tenements themselves pervaded their efforts. Lawrence Veiller, the
architect of the Tenement House Act and the nation's leading
housing expert,422 believed the evils of the tenements degraded the
individual, thwarted his moral and physical growth, and unleashed
417. MCGOLDRICK ET AL., supra note 394, at 542-43. For example, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the claim that a provision of the Tenement House Act requiring that all
'school sinks" and privy vaults in existing tenement houses be removed and replaced by
individual water closets was an unconstitutional taking of property. See Tenement House
Dep't v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325 (1904), affd, 203 U.S. 583 (1906); see also Gilbert, supra note
403, at 440 (emphasizing that Moeschen was recognized in its time "as an extraordinarily
significant case"). Similar regulations already had been upheld in Rhode Island and
Massachusetts. See id. at 485-86. Provisions of New York City's Building and Fire Prevention
Codes also were upheld against substantive due process challenges. See MCGOLDRICK ET AL.,
supra note 394, at 542-43 (citing cases).
418. See Metro. Bd. of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661 (1868); see also Hubbell v. Higgens,
148 Iowa 36 (1910); Keiper v. City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 761 (1913); ERNST FREUND, THE
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICYAND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 554 (1981) (observing that where
a house is "imminently dangerous to the safety, or offensive to the morals, of the community,"
it may be treated as a nuisance per se, and destroyed). But see Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98
(1895) (declaring unconstitutional an act prohibiting the manufacture of tobacco in a
tenement house because it was not a health law); FREUND, supra, at 139 (discussing how
courts distinguished legislation affecting health and safety from that affecting labor and
economic interests).
419. See VEILLER, supra note 408, at 197.
420. See MCGOLDRICKETAL., supra note 394, at 60 n.127; see also LUBOVE, supra note 398,
at 94 (observing that support among conservatives for laws authorizing expropriation of
tenements was a "premonition of things to come").
421. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 462 (discussing the significance of the jury's
determination at trial in Tenement House Department v. Moeschen).
422. See LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 140.
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his worst animal instincts.42 He thought the tenement bred not
only sickness and death, but also a host of social ills such as crime,
immorality, drunkenness, and family demoralization,42 4 and
described tenement housing reform as an attempt to "cleans[e] the
Augean stables."4' The New York Times was even more blunt,
characterizing tenements as "rotten hives of poverty, vise, and
misery... [that] reeked with psychological and moral disease."426
Such views dovetailed with the conservative economic philoso-
phy espoused by leading reformers who favored regulation of
existing housing over the construction of new public housing. 7
Many did not consider public housing, like financial assistance to
single-mothers, a matter of entitlement. While the government
might need to connect tenements to public water and sewers, it
could not solve the problems of sub-standard housing by construct-
ing new homes. Veiller cautioned:
How delightful it would be to be able to believe that all that is
needed to bring about the proper housing conditions is a change
in the economic status of working people! That given enough
wages, slums would vanish. But alas, it is not to be done so
easily. City slums cannot by wave of a necromancer's wand
become gardens of delight.
4 2 8
Part of the problem, Veiller and others believed, lay with the
inhabitants of the tenements themselves; the inhabitants' needed
to change their behavior before social conditions would improve. As
the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor
put it: "[T]he homes of the New York City poor must be provided
with sunlight, fresh air and the moral safeguard of real domestic-
ity."42
9
Thus, the same moral judgments about poor and immigrant
families that "justified" broad intervention in the home under the
banner of social improvement also marked tenement housing
reform.43°  The health inspectors who implemented tenement
housing legislation were given "general 'drag-net' power" to achieve
423. See id. at 130.
424. See id.
425. Id. at 158-59.
426. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1896, quoted in LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 94.
427. See BREMNER, supra note 310, at 211.
428. VEILLER, supra note 408, at 3.
429. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 395, at 1262 n.30.
430. See id.
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effective reform.43 ' Meanwhile, many viewed social caseworkers as
"deputy housing and sanitation inspectors," and frequently reported
evidence of unsanitary conditions to officials.432
Besides granting wide powers to inspectors, housing reformers
sought to give owners a "club to hold over the delinquent tenant's
head" by authorizing the summary eviction of those tenants who
failed to comply with the law.433 Reformers also believed the threat
of fines might pressure owners into inspecting tenants' apartments
themselves. Thus, the state granted owners a right of access to
prevent the owners from avoiding compliance by hiding behind the
privacy of tenants.434 Not surprisingly, tenement housing reform
could be unpopular,45 and tenants frequently resisted. 416 Individual
housing inspectors were reluctant to order poor families to vacate
sub-standard homes when they could not afford any other place to
live." 7
Reformers also attempted to eradicate the social ills associated
with tenements - especially prostitution and gambling - they
believed had a negative effect on the tenement child.43 Prostitution
and gambling were considered nuisances at common law, and thus
provided grounds for closing an establishment or otherwise
suppressing this practice.439 In many cities, state and local govern
431. VEILLER, supra note 408, at 197; see also supra notes 403-09 and accompanying text.
432. LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 159,201 (observing that these inspectors, who were mostly
women, "found romance and excitement in defective plumbing, vermin-filled bedrooms, and
cracked plaster"); see also VEILLER, supra note 408, at 241 (proposing that health inspectors
in New York City have the right to delegate inspection authority to private individuals who
would "be given practically all of the powers of a city employee so far as inspection is
concerned").
433. VEILLER, supra note 408, at 232.
434. See id. at 241-42.
435. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 497 ("[T]he tenants of the Lower East Side did not rally
around the Tenement House Act any more than upstate New Yorkers cheered the Adirondack
Park Act.").
436. See LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 160-61; see also WALLACE, supra note 410, at 112
(citing the increasing frequency with which citizens lodged complaints against health officials
in New Jersey).
437. See BREMNER, supra note 310, at 210.
438. See COONTZ, supra note 193, at 136 (describing action by the government not only to
regulate slum lords but also to end the "promiscuous" socializing of the lower classes in
tenements and streets); LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 137-38.
439. See FREUND, supra note 418, at 230-31; see also Davis v. State, 10 Ohio Law Abs. 550
(1931) (holding that warrant was not required for forcible entry where evidence established
beyond doubt that the house was being used for purposes of prostitution); ROSEN, supra note
192, at 28-29 (describing procedures under state anti-abatement acts, which enabled any
private citizen to file a complaint against a particular building used for prostitution); cf.
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851) (Shaw, C.J.) (defining police power
as the power to "make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances ... not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
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ments attempted to give police increased power to search premises
like "gaming houses" and "houses of ill repute" where such activities
were believed to take place."' Legislatures also placed attention on
"public areas" within tenements, where "numbers of lewd persons,
men and women" assembled." 1 By analogizing these areas to "a
public street," as opposed to the more protected space of a private
dwelling, reformers sought to extend the police power and eradicate
prostitution from the "public part of the tenement house."442 While
the Tenement House Act provided for strict sanctions against
prostitutes - a six-month prison term - and fined landlords who
knowingly rented their premises for prostitution, courts sought to
limit the liability of owners and lessees of property where prostitu-
tion occurred." 3 The treatment of prostitution by courts and tene-
ment housing reformers reflected the way in which middle-class
Victorian sexual values imbued the social reforms of the period.4
The treatment of private dwellings further suggests how homes
were treated differently based on socio-economic factors. The
Tenement House Act initially did not apply to private dwellings.
Some reformers, including Veiller, proposed extending the law to
private dwellings," 5 but faced political opposition based on the
good and welfare of the commonwealth").
440. See Phelps v. McAdoo, 94 N.Y.S. 265,268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905) (citing Charter for City
of New York, c. 466, § 315 (1901)). But given the widespread existence (and acceptance) of
prostitution, police were themselves sometimes loath to enforce the city charter. See, e.g.,
People v. Glendon, 74 N.Y.S. 794, 795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902) (describing prosecution of a police
officer for neglect for failure to detect and arrest the "woman keeper of a certain house of ill
fame").
441. James B. Reynolds, Prostitution as a Tenement House Evil, in 2 THE TENEMENT HOUSE
PROBLEM 19 (Robert W. De Forest & Lawrence Veiller eds., 1970).
442. Id.
443. See, e.g., Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 166 (1915) (Cardozo, J.)
(stating a 1913 amendment to the Act did not make an owner civilly liable for a single act of
prostitution committed without his knowledge); Tenement House Dep't v. Whitney, 145 N.Y.S.
1011, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914) (holding the lessee of a tenement not liable for an act of
prostitution committed without his knowledge); People v. Rankin, 155 N.Y.S. 86, 96 (N.Y.
Gen. Sess. 1915) (overturning the conviction of a hotel owner because there was insufficient
evidence that he knew about acts of prostitution within the hotel). But see People v. McKinley
Realty & Constr. Co., 169 N.Y.S. 751, 754-55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918) (holding that a tenement
house landlord may be found civilly liable for acts of prostitution committed in the tenement
without his knowledge provided that it was not an isolated act).
444. See, e.g., People ex rel. Eisen v. Flynn, 74 N.Y.S. 740, 741 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902) (stating
that the Tenement House Act meant "to protect honest and virtuous women and children who
inhabit tenement houses from the intrusion of prostitutes, and [that] full enforcement should
be given thereto"); cf. ROSEN, supra note 192, at 52-53 (noting that both male and female
reformers linked eradication of prostitution to protecting the home, though often for different
reasons).
445. See VEILLER, supra note 408, at 13-14 ("[H]ousing reform to be effective must in most
cities concern itself not merely with the tenement house but with the private dwelling."); see
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stigma associated with housing regulation." 6 Courts meanwhile
seized on the ambiguity in the statutory definition of a "tenement
house"" 7 to exclude private dwellings from the Act's coverage.' In
1912, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Act did not apply
to "apartment houses," as opposed to "tenement houses."449
Moreover, regulatory inspections of private homes, unlike those of
tenements, remained firmly within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches.4 50 Whereas a
criminal search looked for concealed property, a housing or health
inspection "look[ed] at property exposed to public view," which, at
least in the public spaces of tenements, was generally accessible
without a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.45'
While housing inspections by health officials may have been a
"time honored procedure," 2 inspectors conducted relatively few of
the "thousands upon thousands" of inspections within a private
home.45' At least through the first decades of the twentieth century,
private homes remained constitutionally protected from routine
housing and health inspections."' The sanctity of private homes
also TRULL, supra note 401, at 111 (arguing that electrical inspections should, but do not,
extend to private dwellings where they are most needed).
446. See VEILLER, supra note 408, at 13-14.
447. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
448. See MCGOLDRICK ET AL., supra note 394, at 83.
449. See Grimmer v. Tenement House Dep't, 204 N.Y. 370 (1912).
450. See generally FREUND, supra note 418, at 42-43.
451. Id. at 42. The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of warrantless
health inspections in District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had held that such inspections violated
the Fourth Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
("To say that a man suspected of a crime has a right to protection against search of his home
without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a crime has no such protection, is a
fantastic absurdity."); see Recent Cases, Constitutional Law - Searches and Seizures -
Inspection of Private Dwelling by Public Health Official Held Unreasonable Search under the
Fourth Amendment, 63 HARV. L. REV. 349, 350 (1949) (suggesting the broader inquiry of
investigations by health inspectors may be more dangerous to privacy and security than a
traditional search for evidence of a crime). The Court affirmed the appeals court's decision,
but did so solely on the ground the statute prohibited warrantless public health inspections,
and thus did not reach the constitutionality of such inspections. See Little, 339 U.S. at 6-7.
The D.C Circuit's view was later rejected by the Supreme Court, when it held the warrant
requirement did not include administrative inspections. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959); infra note 456. The Court later overturned Frank, holding administrative searches
of homes were subject to the warrant requirement, but concluding that a more relaxed
standard requiring less than probable cause was required for such searches. Camara v. Mun.
Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
452. Frank, 359 U.S. at 370.
453. Comment, supra note 401, at 530 n.60.
454. See FREUND, supra note 418, at 43.
[I]t would seem that administrative officers cannot be vested with general power
to enter private premises at any time, except to abate actually existing public
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would, however, change over the coming decades as such regulatory
searches grew increasingly frequent45 and came to be accepted by
the courts.45
C. Assessment of Tenement Housing Reform
In certain respects, tenement housing reform was similar to
other reforms of the period directed at the poor: inspectors were
given broad powers of access without concern for the privacy of the
purported beneficiaries, regulations were used as a vehicle for
broader social change, and the approach of reformers reflected
deeply rooted assumptions about class and race.
In several important respects tenement housing reform differed
from its contemporary reforms in its conceptualization and treat-
ment of the home. To begin with, tenement housing reformers
emphasized adherence to formal procedures, such as sufficient
notice and service of process in the event of a violation,4 7 and to
record-keeping, which became increasingly standardized.45 In
addition, tenement housing reformers often had a specific target.
Rather than emphasizing the role of general structural forces, to
explain poverty, they tended to isolate a specific villain - the
landlord or owner:
The state has not only a right but a duty to perform and must
say to private individuals: "Thus far you may go, but no farther.
You shall not be permitted to build a house in which people
ought not to live; you shall not be permitted to so mismanage
nuisances, and that every such inspection against the will of the owner should
be based on judicial authority complying with the constitutional requirements
with regard to searches.
Id.
455. See Frank, 359 U.S. at 372 n.16 (noting that cities increasingly authorized their
officials to enter and inspect private homes for health code violations); see also Comment,
Health Inspection of Private Dwelling Without Search Warrant, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1950)
(suggesting the infrequency with which health inspectors met opposition helps explain the
lack of direct authority on this issue).
456. See Frank, 359 U.S. at 366-67 (holding that the Constitution's warrant requirement
did not apply to health inspections of private dwellings; distinguishing such inspections from
criminal searches). The Supreme Court determined that an orderly, afternoon visit by health
inspectors, without power to force entry, "touch[es] at most upon the periphery of the
important interests" embodied in the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id. The Court subsequently overruled Frank, concluding the Constitution's
warrant requirement applied to administrative searches of private premises, but also holding
that less than probable cause needed to be shown. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
457. See VEILLER, supra note 408, at 235-36.
458. See TRULL, supra note 401, at 39-40.
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your house that it is unhealthful or dangerous for people to live
in it...."
The state can most appropriately extend the strong arm of the
law toward those weaker members of the community who are
unable to protect themselves. It is clearly within its duties to
protect the community to the fullest degree from the conse-
quences of lack of foresight and from the willingness on the part
of individuals to exploit their weaker brothers.459
In tenement housing reform, the main interference was not with the
privacy of tenants, but rather with the property rights of landlords,
who the government expected to bear the economic brunt of the new
regulations.46 Moreover, while reformers displayed a paternalistic
sense of protecting helpless and passive tenants from exploitative
landlords,461 they also articulated a sharp critique of the unequal
distribution of wealth and power in society.
Finally, although tenement housing reformers sacrificed privacy
in the short-run, they sought to increase it in the end. For example,
they sought to eliminate airshafts not only because they "convey[ed]
of smells and noise," but also because they presented "one of the
greatest elements in destroying privacy in the tenement house."462
Through airshafts, one could both hear and see into other apart-
ments in the tenement, which led to "grave immorality" in numer-
ous instances. 41 Similarly, reformers instituted zoning laws and
building codes that prohibited working-class families from sharing
quarters.4" As one commentator observed: "The housing reformer
accepted the tenement as a fact of life only grudgingly and reluc-
tantly. His ideal was the privacy of the detached single-family
home, in contrast to the 'promiscuity in human beehives, rendering
459. LAWRENCE VEILLER, HOUSING REFORM 85-86 (1910), quoted in Gribetz & Grad, supra
note 395, at 1262 n.31; see also Health Dep't v. Dassori, 47 N.Y.S. 641, 643 (N.Y. App. Div.
1897), appeal dismissed, 159 N.Y. 245 (1899) ("The condition of these houses arose not alone
from the habits of the inmates, but principally and largely from the construction, plans and
location of the buildings themselves.").
460. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 450 (noting the cost for replacing school sinks alone
was an estimated eight to nine million dollars).
461. See BREMNER, supra note 310, at 204 ("You are liable to arrest if you allow your stable
to become filthy and a nuisance. The landlord may do pretty much what he pleases with his
tenements.") (quoting a writer in Scribner's Magazine); Gribetz & Grad, supra note 395, at
1262.
462. 1 THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM 14 (Robert W. De Forest & Lawrence Veiller eds.,
1970).
463. Id.
464. See COONTZ, supra note 193, at 136.
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independence and isolation of the family impossible.'"465 Or, as a
reformer envisioned, "[t]here must be a separate house, and as far
as possible, separate rooms, so that at an early period of life the idea
of rights to property, the right to things, to privacy, may be in-
stilled. " "
One may also explain the difference between tenement housing
reform and other reforms, such as child protection and mothers'
pensions, partly in terms of gender. The object of tenement housing
reform was not single-mothers, as in the case of mothers' pensions
programs, but generally two-parent families because sub-standard
housing conditions threatened their privacy.467 Indeed, in many res-
pects the tenement was the antithesis of the idealized home of the
period: the planned suburb and garden city.468 Reformers stressed
the importance of the whole tenement neighborhood, advocating the
construction of parks and playgrounds as well as the improvement
of schools.469
Reformers ultimately envisioned the movement of the urban
masses from crowded cities to the country, where planned suburbs
would have a transformative social effect by "reestablishing the
primary group controls of the village or small town which had
disintegrated in the modern city."470 In the process, the state would
magically transfer the values of middle-class Americans to the
teeming masses of immigrants and workers presently crowded into
the nation's cities.471 Tenement housing reform did not eradicate
the slum or provide decent homes to all who needed them, but it
nonetheless had a significant impact on housing construction and
conditions.472 While its means were intrusive, its approach pater-
nalistic, and its vision largely nostalgic, tenement housing reform
465. LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 110 (citation omitted); see also Gilbert, supra note 403, at
449 ("[T]he thrust of the [tenement housing] reforms was to discourage the continuation of the
'tenement evil' and to encourage more expensive apartment buildings, and, ideally, single-
family homes."); JACOB RiS, THE BATTLE WITH THE SLUM 85 (1902) ("The double-decker
[house] is doomed, and the twenty-five-foot-lot has had its day.... We are at last in a fair way
to make the slum unprofitable, and that is the only way to make it go."), quoted in Gilbert,
supra note 403, at 450.
466. COONTZ, supra note 193, at 135-36 (quoting Charles Neill, Commissioner of Labor,
1905).
467. See, e.g., Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 484 (1929) (Cardozo, J.) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Multiple Dwelling Act; stating that eradicating slums is the duty of
the whole state, and has as its end the "quality of men and women").
468. See generally VEILLER, supra note 408, at 220-23.
469. See LUBOVE, supra note 398, at 68-69.
470. Id. at 252.
471. See id.
472. See Gilbert, supra note 403, at 494-95.
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ultimately strived to increase the privacy of poor families - headed,
it was generally assumed, by men.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Article makes clear, the sanctity of the home is deeply
embedded in American law and tied to beliefs about private
property, privacy, and limits on government power. During the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the home became the
center of important legal and political debates and the subject of
increasing regulation. How courts, public officials, and reformers
treated the home turned partly on whose home the party supervised
or investigated. While the home largely remained a man's castle in
areas affecting traditional rights and privileges, it provided less
security to those singled out for social reform, such as the poor,
immigrants, and women, particularly single mothers.
Throughout the nineteenth century, severe criminal sanctions
for offenses like burglary and the availability of civil remedies for
trespass helped protect the home from unwanted intrusion. Pro-
secutors and state courts resisted a tough approach to marital
violence because they believed intervening in domestic disputes
would threaten the ideals of domestic privacy and tranquility.
Similarly, courts barred interspousal tort suits and solidified
spousal evidentiary privileges to secure the peace of the household
and shield it from public scandal. Such efforts to safeguard the
home against outside interference supported the interests and
concerns of middle- and upper-class men, as matters of domestic
discord were left to be resolved, as they traditionally had been, by
the autonomous, patriarchal institution of"family government," and
not in a public forum.
In the area of federal crimes, the growing power of law enforce-
ment in business regulation and later in Prohibition cases threat-
ened the home's privileged status and sparked an explosion of con-
stitutional litigation concerning the boundaries of lawful searches
and seizures. Courts in turn secured the protection of the home by
making sweeping and far-reaching proclamations about the home's
sanctity while linking the home with privacy in a series of landmark
constitutional criminal procedure cases beginning in the 1880s.
A much different picture of the home emerged in connection
with important social reforms of the period. The dramatic changes
brought by urbanization, immigration, and industrialization led to
a wave of reforms that sought to address social problems like crime,
poverty, disease, and family disintegration through intensive
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regulation of the home. The child protection movement, mothers'
pensions programs, and tenement housing reform brought unprece-
dented intervention into the homes and lives of society's more
marginal members, such as the poor, immigrants, and single
mothers. There, the response to social change was not to seek
refuge in the physical boundaries of the home and moral security of
domestic privacy, but rather to expand government power and
renounce traditional values of property and family autonomy.
In the child protection context, local officials, social workers,
and private agencies like the various SPCCs intervened directly in
homes to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect by parents.
For these parents, many of whom were immigrants, poverty itself
was often a basis for police-like investigations of their homes and for
the eventual removal of their children to institutions. The growing
acceptance of the idea of separate spheres, which linked women to
children and the home, and made them the guarantors of domestic
harmony, meant that women, particularly single mothers, were
often the ones deemed morally unfit to raise their children. Even
after the emphasis changed during the first decades of the twentieth
century from breaking up to preserving families, the homes and
private lives of poor families continued to be subjected to close
scrutiny.
The administration of mothers' pensions likewise reflected
significant interference in the homes and lives of the women the
programs intended to assist. Single mothers endured invasive,
highly subjective, and often humiliating investigations that sought
to determine their financial and moral fitness and uncover any
misdeed, ranging from bad hygiene to having sexual relations with
men. The experience of mothers' pensions programs shows how
prevailing views about proper gender roles and financial depend-
ency on the public combined to deny single mothers' any claim to
privacy. Mothers' pensions also foreshadow the role of suitable
home requirements and racially discriminatory policies in subse-
quent federal welfare programs.
Tenement housing reform further illustrates how well-inten-
tioned reforms ignored or disregarded concerns for the privacy of the
intended beneficiaries and exhibited moral assumptions based on
class and race. Here, however, the interference was more with
property than privacy, as reformers forced owners to make changes
to the squalid and often unsafe conditions in tenements. Their goal
was to increase privacy in the end, and tenement housing reform
served as a step towards the ideal of the detached single-family
home. In addition, unlike the child protection movement and
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mothers' pensions programs, class, not gender, predominantly
influenced tenement housing reform. It ultimately sought to square
the circle between closely regulating the home and realizing the
vision of the home as an entity unto itself, the virtually impregnable
castle romanticized in other areas of the law.
